

# CURRENT *History*

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OF WORLD AFFAIRS

DECEMBER 1965 ✓

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FOR READING TODAY...FOR REFERENCE TOMORROW

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# CURRENT History

DECEMBER, 1965

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*This issue is the first of a two-issue review by Current History of recent developments in South and Central America. In this introductory article on Peru, the author raises the question, "Is it possible that the government of Peru can be nonantagonistic to the Soviets, pro-United States, pro-Peruvian economic nationalism, a promoter of social reform at home and still survive?" He answers that "The chances . . . of success are now better than they have been in 20 years."*

## Peru: Encouraging New Spirit

By JAMES C. CAREY

*Professor of History, Kansas State University*

THE SPECIAL NATIONAL ELECTION of June, 1963, marked a change in Peruvian politics. After some harassment by the ruling military *junta*, the voters chose a man who wore a coat of many colors. Fifty-year-old architect Fernando Belaúnde Terry had studied in Lima, in Paris, and in Austin, Texas. Despite his aristocratic background, he was considered progressive and independent. Between 1955 and 1963, he was able to move the many-sided Popular Action party (*Acción Popular*) from oblivion to power.

Belaúnde presented an extremely diversified program which drew support from the Christian Democrats, the Communists and the so-called Communists, recruits from the old National Democratic Front, some discontented *pristas*, important segments of the upper

echelon of the military, and from several weaker political factions. One of the slogans, "The Conquest of Peru by Peruvians," appealed to those who wanted a nation that was "democratic, nationalistic, and revolutionary." The meaning of this was never made clear, but in part it was a call for Peruvians to take on a sense of widespread civic responsibility in confronting social problems.

Since inauguration, the administration has maintained itself with barely enough support in parliament, where there is an active loyal opposition directed by *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA), the nation's oldest and, until recently at least, strongest social reform party.<sup>1</sup> The relative economic and political stability of the last two and one-half years suggests an unaccustomed maturity for this land of largely undeveloped physical and human resources.

Belaúnde has done remarkably well driving a seven-wheeled cart over a rough and rocky road. The military remains the power wheel (though a temporarily quiet one). *Acción*

<sup>1</sup> Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre founded the left-but anti-Communist APRA in 1924 when he was in exile in Mexico. Long a powerful socio-educational as well as political influence, APRA several times has been denied the presidency as the military and the oligarchy connived against it.

*Popular* and APRA are still important wheels, whereas the *Unión Nacional Odrísta* (UNO), the party of former president General Manuel Odría (who has not had strong military support recently), is on the wane. The Peruvian bankers, together with most important property holders, attempt to direct the cart in their particular direction and constitute enough of an entity to be called a wheel. United States business interests continue to exercise a pressure, although not so much as in years past. Difficult to evaluate is the squeaking seventh wheel, the restless, disorganized, rural Amerindian populace.

### SOME REAL PROGRESS

The awkward cart has made real progress. Back in June, 1962, the regular elections had opened a year of uncertainty and apprehension when the military intervened to prevent the election of *Aprista* Haya de la Torre. Haya, with the largest vote (but still lacking the necessary one-third plurality), appeared to be headed for constitutional election in parliament. At that point the military, which had long feuded with APRA, took over.<sup>2</sup> A four-man *junta*, headed by General Ricardo Pérez Godoy, seized power, apparently motivated merely by dislike for APRA and possibly by personal ambition. The United States promptly reduced economic assistance to Lima. In March, 1963, the military clique supported a move which ousted Godoy and placed General Nicolás Lindley López in the *junta* presidency.<sup>3</sup> The clique had earlier shifted back and forth by placing Communists in key labor union positions (probably to counter APRA strength which was opposed to communism); then in January, 1963, it decreed a state of siege while charging Communist plots and Communist-led strikes in the arrest of some 800 to 1,000 persons.

In preparation for the special 1963 election, the *junta* issued a *White Book* alleging evidence of fraud in the 1962 election, despite

<sup>2</sup> A bitter rivalry began in 1931 when military dictator, Luis M. Sánchez Cerro, tried forcibly to stamp out *Aprismo*.

<sup>3</sup> The four-man *junta* headed by General Ricardo Pérez Godoy included Major-General Pedro Vargas Prada, Vice-Admiral Francisco Torres Matos, and General Nicolás Lindley López.

the fact that earlier a national election board had failed to find proof of significant irregularities. Luis Alberto Sánchez, San Marcos University rector and *Aprista* vice-president candidate, labeled the *White Book* an "intimidation" of voters and prejudicial to APRA's chances. Some believe that the public apathy to the 1963 election was attributable to a belief in rumors that the military would not accept an *Aprista* victory. General Lindley pledged the return of armed forces to barracks following the election, although the *junta* never hid its opposition to the *Aprista* and the number of eligible voters was reduced from about 2.2 million to 1.9 million. This was also harmful to APRA's chances. APRA's charge of fraud was supported by evidence of sabotage in the departments of Ancash and Cajamarca (both *Aprista* strongholds). Blank papers had been sent in place of ballots. But these two departments could not have stopped Belaúnde's election.

Belaúnde's slightly left-of-center position in the splintered political arena gave no hope as Odría's UNO and APRA linked forces in an opportunistic movement to maintain the balance of control in parliament. *Acción Popular's* antecedents were not deep in Peru where there was no well-founded, long-established political party other than APRA. At times, Belaúnde's campaign smacked of bombast and even demagoguery as he promised roads to the interior, an indigenous communal self-help program, social justice, land reform, expanded educational and housing facilities, growth in the economy, credit reform, economic nationalism keyed to greater national control over United States oil interests, and various other attractions. Ideologically, *Acción Popular* has much in common with *Aprismo*, and this probably explains the relative success of the present government. Haya de la Torre was cheated out of the 1962 election, but he and his followers can find little seriously to oppose in the basic philosophy and actions of the new government. In addition, Belaúnde gained some popular advantage from his moderate-left stance while Haya's public image suffered from APRA's recent alignment with rightist Odría.



Undoubtedly some Peruvians, who recognized that reform was overdue but who feared a violent outbreak once serious social reform took root, have come to look upon Belaúnde as a saving compromise between APRA and the army. Grouped around this view are rising middle-class people, professionals, students, and some urban workers, who hope for stability and growth for the nation. APRA is still in a strong position in the unions, but economic growth works in favor of *Acción Popular*. Destitute, rural Amerindian *campesinos*, feudal peasants in most respects, have become interested in the government's emphasis on ancient indigenous motifs and approaches.<sup>4</sup> This latter group is pulled back and forth between the promise of an orderly reform movement run by the government and the appeals to direct violent action by forces such as the *Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria* (M.I.R.) which is fed, in part, on the notion that international Castroism will initiate needed changes.

Although there is a new hope as well as fresh stirrings of national pride in Lima and the coastal cities, few if any of the basic problems have yet been significantly touched by *Acción Popular*. There is an illiteracy rate of nearly 60 per cent and a gigantic obstacle exists as long as most of Peru's four million Indian-speaking illiterate adults find Spanish a foreign language. Eastern Peru with over one-half of the territory has only 623,000 of the 11 million people and these earn a miserably low income. Even the feudal-type farmer on the Western slope gets but starvation wages from absentee landlords. Although many of the poor leave the interior and flow to urban coastal centers, there is no immediate relief when one-third of the nation's food has to be imported. Acreage per capita under cultivation is about 0.44 as compared with 0.79 in India and 0.42 in China. Slightly over two per cent of Peru's population controls 70 per cent of all arable land, or, in other terms, about one per cent owns over

62 per cent of the farm land. The average peasant's wages (an ephemeral concept in most respects) are approximately \$1 (U.S.) weekly. One-tenth of one per cent of the population still earns 20 per cent of the national income while 56 per cent of the population stays alive the best way it can and makes around \$4.50 a month.

Against this dismal picture it is noteworthy that the government stays in control and makes a little progress. Belaúnde gained influence in the reluctant parliament after the December, 1963, municipal elections reflected widespread confidence in the administration. Of course, many of the *campesinos* do not vote. Even so, in January, 1964, the opposition censured the government by a parliamentary vote of 74-46, bringing about the resignation of the cabinet as provided in the constitution. Part of the discontent hinged on the lax manner in which the administration was dealing with the allegedly Communist-inspired invasion of *haciendas* by land-seeking Amerindians. Some critics have commented that the present government seemed satisfied to have unhappy peasant-farmers seize large estates in the mountains. In this way, Belaúnde had a lever on parliament which would help move that body toward his proposed agrarian reforms. With the aid of the United States loans, some road construction and public housing have been achieved. For several years, Peru has had one of the largest of the United States Peace Corps contingents.

Now the Land of the Inca has its own domestic program as well. The Popular Cooperation program in 1964 included the participation of 1,200 university students (selected from 4,000 volunteers) who spent their vacations working in interior villages on community developments projects. Non-Indian Peruvians have so long stood aloof, ashamed of the Indians and making the Indians ashamed of themselves, that any real effort in cooperation is an important step.

In his state of the nation message of July, 1964, the president declared that Peru's finances were healthy, pointing to the fact that foreign exchange reserves were up to

<sup>4</sup> Belaúnde often refers to the community type of cooperation used in the days of Inca glory. This approach is not dissimilar to that experienced in Mexico's twentieth century revolution.

\$165 million (U.S.) compared with \$92 million when he took office. Encouraging is the fact that Peru's economy has been growing at the rate of nearly six or seven per cent per annum now for several years.<sup>5</sup> It should be remembered that the Manuel Prado and the military *junta* administrations turned over finances in relatively sound condition, by Peruvian standards.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, Belaúnde made it clear that economic progress was not all favorable; there appeared to be an \$80 million deficit in the federal budget. Further to complicate the picture were the price level increases and accompanying threats of run-away inflation. The state of the *sol*, still one of Latin America's soundest currencies (26.70 to the U.S. dollar), depended to some extent on reduction of tax evasion in personal and corporate income taxes. *The New York Times* (August 3, 1964) reported that private business was encouraging the government to cut back the deficit but, at the same time, was opposed to the minister of finance's suggestion to increase taxes.

## LAND REFORM

The present government has often presented a combination of razzle-dazzle vote-catching along with suggestions for needed social reform. Elaborate land reform legislation became law in May, 1964, but execution is still largely in the planning stages. The new agrarian reform legislation indicates a concern for the vast undeveloped *sierra* and

jungle interior, yet the immensity of the problem circumvents the possibility of any great degree of success in a mere five or ten years. This complex but moderate legislation, which attempts to tackle rural Peru's economic and social problems in one fell swoop, has the following objectives: distribution of land to the landless (allotments must be farmed and not rented out); protection of land farmed efficiently; elimination of small plots; introduction of modern agricultural techniques; consolidation of Indian communities; development of cooperatives; preservation of the sugar industry; rationalization of irrigation; destruction of feudalism; encouragement of peasant leadership; punishment of peasant leaders who raid and seize land; encouragement of family farming; denial of individual ownership in Indian "communities"; promotion of colonization in areas of unimproved land; and the financing of industry through agrarian debt.<sup>7</sup>

For years there has been talk of agrarian reform, but this is the first significant commitment of the sort ever made by a Peruvian government. Much of the study and planning behind the agrarian reform program was done by the first vice-president, Edgardo Seoane who is more of a gentleman farmer than a politician, having been formally trained in agricultural engineering. His thinking on the subject was outlined in a book, *Surcos de Paz* (*Furrows of Peace*), which was published early in 1963. To a considerable degree the future of Peru depends upon how much and how fast something can be done to bring the feudal peasantry up to modern conditions.

In its rural program, the government faces many perplexing problems as a result of the years of the exploitation which bred American Indian distrust of outsiders. Belaúnde, an architect, has appointed various technological experts to his circle of high officials with the hope that science will be effectively employed. The main problems, however, may yet be those which call for social scientists who are usually more familiar with the intricacies of cultural patterns. The Indian greatness lies in the past. A nostalgic moodiness constantly directs attention backward toward the pas-

<sup>5</sup> *The Andean Air Mail and Peruvian Times* (Lima: January 22, 1965) put it at 7.0 per cent for 1963, while *Latin American Business Highlights* (pub. by The Chase Manhattan Bank of New York, 1st quart., 1965) estimated the 1964 growth at 5.4.

<sup>6</sup> In 1962, Peru increased the number of manufacturing plants established by some 20 per cent over 1961. The home-developed fishmeal industry was well under way by 1962, and this product has since raised Peru into the category of the world's leading fish nation. Fish has become the nation's largest foreign exchange earner.

<sup>7</sup> Land titles for the indigenous community have rested on a particular legalistic theory. The community, or cooperative, has antecedents in the pre-Columbian concept of the *ayllu* where men and community land were all wedded as with a mystical bond. For a summary statement of the Agrarian Reform Bill, see Richard W. Patch, "The Peruvian Agrarian Reform Bill," *American Universities Field Staff* (New York: March, 1964). The United States Department of State has a 65-page translation of the law.

glories of the Inca civilization and its great capital city of Cuzco. For this state of mind, reforms are more apt to be associated with political and social justice rather than with machines, industry, capital, commerce, or even irrigation projects. Cuzco, the traditionally glorified city of yesteryear, carries in its image no stock exchange or smokestack.

It is highly questionable that mere land reform can help sufficiently in integrating this large segment (approximately one-half the population) into Peruvian national society. A great part of the problem in the past was convincing the oligarchic forces that something of the sort had to be accomplished. Although it is doubtful that the present sort of peasantry is compatible with a modern society or even with a modern nation, the peasantry cannot and will not disappear or be dissolved into society simply by means of a land reform program. Finally, there is no certainty that a more equitable distribution of land will result in higher production. It appears that such developments as the Popular Cooperation program and agrarian reform are merely ways to gain time to prepare for the significant social upheaval which is bound to occur; sooner or later, in the structure of Peruvian society.

Between the military *coup* of July, 1962, and the first quarter of 1965, there have been about 195 Indian peasant invasions of the *haciendas*. The Amerindians were looking for farm land. Somewhere between 80 and 10 (possibly more) people have been killed in the fighting. Only the fact that the Indians are disorganized and separated by mountains, valleys, deserts, jungles and even language prevents them from taking more directly furious action. Communists, or alleged Communists, and various guerrilla fighters, such as Hugo Blanco, his cousin César Galdos, Luis de la Puente, Guillermo Lobaton Milla, and another known as Ismael Taredes, have tried to rouse the peasantry from its lethargy and to incite them to concerted violent action.<sup>8</sup> A United States copper

mining concern, the Cerro Corporation, has had difficulty with the Indian "communal movement" which has tried to take and hold farming lands now held by the corporation. There has been some evidence that the Castro-sponsored leftist revolutionary movement, M.I.R., distributes incendiary leaflets. Everything indicates that significant changes are coming. It is not clear yet whether they will be relatively peaceful or violent.

The present administration in Lima seems to stand in the middle of all this and ask for "all things for all people"—for increased production and a more just distribution of wealth, enhanced national prestige and national sovereignty, alignment with the United States and cooperation with the inter-American system, support of domestic bankers and large property interests, and more control over foreign investments with increased United States economic assistance at the same time.

On occasion, Belaúnde has appeared impatient with the Alliance for Progress and with the United States. Part of his impatience may be merely a political show for home consumption. In his inaugural address to parliament, he said that the "ridiculously low prices paid for Latin American's raw materials" were the "direct cause of our backwardness and misery." It would seem that he desires to be friendly to the United States, while at the same time he intends to be more independent of Washington than most of his predecessors. He once declared that the Alliance for Progress had demonstrated more interest in the projection of capital than it did in aiding people. His government was unhappy when a request for a \$10 million loan for picks and shovels was turned down in Washington. While Lima wanted to equip 144 tool-lending centers in the *sierra*, Washington was impressed with the fact that heavy road building equipment could not be lost or stolen so readily as picks and shovels.

The growth of an independent Peruvian attitude has meant that Lima has not continued to be a strong advocate against Castro in the O.A.S. Popular feeling in Peru has also reflected a desire for less ready support of Washington's role in general. In June,

<sup>8</sup> The newspaper *La Prensa* (Lima: April 19-22, 1965) called for strong countertactics against these agitators.

1965, Peru voted with the so-called "neutrals"—Mexico, Chile, and Uruguay—against the Washington-O.A.S. plan for formation of the inter-American military force in the Dominican Republic. The *Apristas* were especially vocal in denouncing the United States act of military intervention in Santo Domingo. In September, 1965, the parliament passed, unanimously, a resolution condemning the United States House resolution which approved the use of force in any American nation threatened by a Communist take-over. This independence may not be entirely for the worse. A few years back, Peru was in danger of developing a charity, or even beggar, complex toward the United States. Under those conditions, United States foreign assistance ran the risk of being a sedative to social reform.

At least, Peru's current foreign policy seems to be a more accurate reflection of the feeling of many Peruvians. In the long run, this should be sounder than having an unrepresentative government in Lima subservient to Washington. National self-respect and national self-dependency now have a better chance to develop. Of course, interwoven into the picture is the United States policy of protection for its private dollar investments and the fact that the Peruvian oligarchy has significant connections with United States businesses. There is little to indicate that Belaúnde would risk extreme aggravation of either United States investors or Peruvian merchants and industrialists, despite his statement (October, 1963) before the national convention of the *Acción Popular* party that Peru's millionaires had created a war chest in order to oppose agrarian reform. Remarks of this sort tend to crop up at Peruvian political party conventions.

### PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE INVESTMENT

Troubling Lima-Washington relations for years has been the question of United States protection for private dollar investments.

<sup>9</sup> Domestic politics also complicate the petroleum question. See James C. Carey, *Peru and the United States, 1900-1962* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), pp. 171-173, 188-191.

Foremost in this respect has been the status of the International Petroleum Company (I.P.C.), a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. I.P.C. bought the La Brea and Pariñas area (the largest producing field on the west coast of Latin America) from British owners after a presumed settlement of a disputed tax matter. Then, in 1931, the Peruvian government sought to revise the arbitration award; there has been controversy of some sort ever since. Belaúnde campaigned, in part, on a program to secure a greater share of the oil profits. He presented a bill to parliament which required I.P.C. to pay 60 per cent of its profits as well as a royalty to the government in exchange for cancellation of the alleged tax debt of \$50 million and a renewal of the company's concession. I.P.C. claimed that the law would be confiscatory because, it alleged, the government would get 102 per cent of the profits. Further, the company pointed to its high tax payments and the low prices of petroleum products in Peru.<sup>9</sup>

Parliament gave the president approval to go ahead on the I.P.C. matter; but Belaúnde seems uncertain as to how far and how fast he wants to go. He will not be stampeded into rash action. Thus the party directorate suspended radical Mario Villaran (federal deputy and former secretary-general of *Acción Popular*) after the latter objected to Belaúnde's moderate line on the petroleum controversy. However, at the national convention of *Acción Popular* (Ayacucho, May 31, 1965), Belaúnde said that if I.P.C. failed to accept the government's proposal for settlement over the oilfields, the company would be expropriated and compensated in bond as was being done with property expropriated under the agrarian reform law. A year earlier, in a state of the nation message, Belaúnde had spoken in softer tones of an operation contract which suggested a cooperative arrangement between the government of Peru and the company.

Peru has more than \$1.3 billion of foreign investment, of which 60 per cent or more is direct private capital from north of the border. When economic assistance and loans are included, it is obvious that the dollar



elds a "big stick." The Peruvian foreign minister points to a special tax status long enjoyed by I.P.C. and I.P.C. calls for help from the United States State Department. The United States will probably accept any solution satisfactory to the company. Peruvian economic nationalists clamor for action, but Lima knows that it risks a reduction in the amount of United States aid if it acts recklessly. The oil question does not seem to provide a real check on new dollar investments in Peru. A flow of capital continues to go into Peruvian minerals, fishing, and extensive automobile assembly plants.

How long can Belaúnde and the *Acción Popular* continue this political balancing act? It has had the support of powerful military institutions from at least July, 1962. Is it possible that the government of Peru can be non-antagonistic to the Soviets, pro-United States, anti-Peruvian economic nationalism, a promoter of social reform at home, and still survive? The chances (however good or bad they are) of success now are better than they have been in 20 years. Peru fits rather well into many aspects of the Kennedy-type Alliance For Progress, the guided peaceful revolutionary approach. Also, new in Peru is the existence of an openly functioning royal opposition." Always before either the power centers managed to stifle or smash the opposition, or the opposition was not truly concerned with the welfare of the nation; thus was not "loyal." With the present administration, the forces of Belaúnde and his position are so evenly matched that each can destroy the other, but to do so would be doing serious damage or ruination to Peru.

In course, the highly organized, powerful military could again upset the gains being made in constitutional government (as it has done before), but up to date it has generally favored the present administration. The hope that the military will not intervene rests on the fact that the army dislikes its traditional foe, the APRA, rather than that it is especially happy with Belaúnde. The traditional army-APRA rivalry should be abated slightly by the cooperation between Haya's men and Odría's. The customary power forces of the country

seem to be slightly less rigidly fixed in 1965, and this suggests a greater fluidity in the formative economic and political processes as well as in the nature of society itself. In the principal urban areas this appears to be working for less stratification of society. Meanwhile, the peasantry and most Amerindians, wherever they are, remain outside almost all these changes. In this condition, they are not effective citizens, intelligent producers, or active consumers. In fact, they are scarcely men. Although the careful student of Latin American political matters learns early it is best not to prophesy, there is an encouraging new spirit of broader national-community concern in Peru. The military and the church both show real promise of developing progressive socially-responsible programs which can stimulate a civic-mindedness, formerly so lacking.

It is possible that Peru is now making its most significant thrust yet into the twentieth century. If this proves to be so, it may well be because of the doors that are opened and the hopes that are raised, rather than because of the immediate accomplishments. In the crisis of September 15, 1965, Premier Fernando Schwalb and his cabinet resigned and were replaced amid opposition criticism that *Acción Popular* had been too easy on the guerrillas who were led by Communists or so-called Communists. In this atmosphere, there is always the danger that the APRA-Odria opposition will stymie the long overdue rural reforms if that coalition confuses autochthonous social upheaval with international communism. Meanwhile, the seven-wheeled cart goes slowly along, rattling over a rough road.

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James C. Carey lived in Latin America for seven years, five of which were spent in Peru, where he was Director of *Colegio America*. For a time he served as a member of the city and provincial council of government in Callao. His writings include numerous articles and a book, *Peru and the United States, 1900-1962* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964).

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*Describing Bolivia's 1964 "Revolution of Restoration," this author feels that this may be "a rare instance in Latin America of a military coup that cannot impose a stereotypical rightist dictatorship."*

# Revolution and Stability in Bolivia

By DWIGHT B. HEATH

*Associate Professor of Anthropology, Brown University*

THE FIRST TWELVE YEARS of political stability in Bolivia ended in revolution in November, 1964. Bolivia's central position in the South American continent suggests that it might be a strategically significant nation; in fact, it was wealthy and powerful during the colonial period, under the name of Alto Peru. Now, in a paradoxical way, it is far in the vanguard of social development within the hemisphere while remaining a poor relation in economic terms, with little prospect for marked improvement in the foreseeable future.

Transportation costs are high even within the rugged country; these costs also markedly raise the prices of everything coming in or going out, because Bolivia has no seaport.<sup>1</sup> The nation's economy is based on tin, which now costs more to produce than it brings on the world market; Bolivia continues to export it, even at a loss, because she needs foreign exchange. Attempts at economic diversification in recent years have had mixed results: the newly expanded national petroleum monopoly makes it possible to import less fuel than before, but optimism about its export potential was premature. Domestic agriculture has expanded to meet national de-

mand, but problems of planning are reflected in the fact that abundant rice harvests last year did not even return the costs of production, and the same is true of sugar cane.

There are few manufactures, and both infrastructure and market are limited where more than half the population of about 5 million are Indians who still speak indigenous languages rather than Spanish, and have an average per capita annual income of little more than \$100. It is also clear that Bolivia's tradition of political instability is an obstacle to economic development because it makes a poor climate for capital investment. In order to understand some of the paradoxes of this country—aptly called "a beggar sitting on a throne of gold," because of the virtual poverty of its people despite the enormous wealth of its natural resources—we must recognize that Bolivia has undergone both "revolutions" and revolution.

Bolivia holds something of a record for political unrest, even on a continent which has long been characterized as a hotbed of revolutions. Ferment is so commonplace that some newspapers dismissed the fighting of April 22, 1952, as "merely the 179th revolution in Bolivia's 126 years of independence" although the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (M.N.R.) which came to power at that time remained to rule for 12 years and completely transformed the basic social order of the country (which had been little changed since colonial times). Clearly, the

<sup>1</sup> The best introduction to Bolivia is Harold Osborne's *Bolivia: A Land Divided* (3rd revised edition) (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1964). For more detail on social and political institutions, see *U.S. Army Area Handbook for Bolivia* (Washington: Special Operations Research Office, 1963).

a difference between the many so-called revolutions," and a *real* revolution.

Most of the history of Bolivia comprises a badly monotonous succession of weak, elected presidents, overthrown by military juntas or dictators, who eventually appointed ineffectual civilian figurehead-presidents, and so forth. Usually such "revolutions" consisted of little more than a change of the palace guard and transfer of the presidential sash. The cavalier rules of the game required that the man to be deposed be notified in time, so that he could comfortably seek asylum elsewhere, and that there be no real fighting beyond perhaps a symbolic garrison skirmish. Certainly, it was inconceivable that the general populace should have had any voice or active role in government. For that matter, the government had little to do with the general populace.

It is one of the many paradoxes of Bolivia that there are more "revolutions" than are reported—and there are also fewer! A great many armed clashes, mostly between students and police, are not even reported in the national press. At the same time, it is highly probable that a fair number of the anti-government coups that are "exposed" just before they are supposed to take place are actually staged by the incumbents as an expedient rationale for imposing martial law, exiling opposition leaders, or otherwise consolidating their position. In short, there is no doubt that attempts at overthrowing the government are a perennial feature of the Bolivian scene, but it is also very likely that many reported plots are really only frame-ups.

Bolivia, then, has had more than her share

of "revolutions," in which political and economic power merely changed hands within a small group of literate whites. Meanwhile, the Indians remained unaffected, ineffectual and isolated in their indigenous communities,<sup>2</sup> or serfs treated as part of the realty on feudal estates.

In 1952, however, Bolivia became the first South American country to undergo the kind of revolution that is truly revolutionary, that broke the back of the old social order, drastically shifted the locus of wealth and power, and served as a basis for remaking society along very different lines. In all of Latin America, such revolutions have occurred only in Mexico, in Bolivia and, subsequently, in Cuba.

### THE M.N.R. REVOLUTION

Most historians share the Bolivian view that the Chaco War in the early 1930's was a crucial turning point. It had been a mutually debilitating war, but defeat by Paraguay was a crushing blow to the pride of the country and led to general repudiation of both civilian and military leaders. At the same time, Bolivia's reliance on Indian conscripts broadened the horizons of peasants who had never before thought of the nation, and dramatically underscored the weakness of the small upper class who had formerly enjoyed a monopoly on the privileges of citizenship.

Dissatisfaction was expressed in a variety of extremist political movements, and the M.N.R. was an outgrowth of this ferment. It comprised a loose coalition of middle-class intellectuals representing a variety of ideologies but united in their realization of the necessity for drastic social reform and concerned with uniting the disparate groups that comprised a nation without a sense of nationhood. The ascendancy of the M.N.R., through coups, subversion, and open fighting in April, 1952, has already been recounted at length.<sup>3</sup> In order to consolidate his position, President Victor Paz set out to weaken the army, which had traditionally provided strong support for the dominant oligarchy. The officer corps was systematically purged, and weapons taken from the armed forces

<sup>2</sup> A "*comunidad indigena*" is a community which retains collective title to an area of land granted by the Crown, and whose traditional sociopolitical autonomy is recognized. Although the author of this article emphasizes recent changes in the way of life of peasants who used to live on haciendas, William E. Carter is also correct in noting continuity in the life of those in such communities; see his *Aymara Communities and the Bolivian Agrarian Reform* (Gainesville: University of Florida, 1964).

<sup>3</sup> A generally reliable account is offered by Richard W. Patch, "Bolivia: U.S. Assistance in a Revolutionary Setting," in Richard N. Adams et al., *Social Change in Latin America Today* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1960).

were distributed to peasants, miners, and others who formed civilian militias "to defend the achievements of the Revolution." A token force of military men was retained for ceremonial purposes, but the sharply reduced army was more often diverted to "civic action" projects such as building roads and clearing land to encourage settlers to come to jungle areas of the east.

With the rise to power of the M.N.R. came the downfall of the "rosca." "Rosca" literally means "thread," as on a screw or drill, and is used in Bolivia as a collective referent for those who were wealthy and powerful in the old order. Some were killed by vengeful "liberated" peasants; some fled the country; and the rest tried to make new lives for themselves in Bolivia. It was not easy, because their property was subject to confiscation by theft as well as by quasi-legal means, and savings quickly disappeared in the galloping inflation that drove the exchange rate from 190 bolivianos to the dollar in 1952, to over 16,000 in 1956.

New social segments arose. The same process that crushed the "rosca" favored the emergence of a new group who fast became immensely wealthy because of partisan favoritism. A complex system of multiple exchange rates prevailed, whereby some could buy dollars at the old rate of 190 bolivianos, and resell them (or, theoretically, sell goods imported with them) at the prevailing rate, thereby becoming millionaires overnight with a minimal investment and no risk.

The highly touted cornerstones of the M.N.R. revolution were nationalization of the tin mines, agrarian reform and universal suffrage. Nationalization of the mines still has enormous symbolic significance, representing an attack on economic imperialism, although it has cost far more than it has brought in economic terms. The national mining enterprise is now losing about \$6 million annually, and United States and German advisors are helping Bolivians try to put it on a paying basis. Maladministration, featherbedding

and lack of labor discipline are major difficulties, but so are other factors over which the M.N.R. has no control, such as a drop in the world price of tin, and the harsh fact that high-grade deposits were almost depleted at the time of nationalization.

The companies were offered token reimbursement for expropriated properties, but only on the condition that they pay supposedly overdue taxes totalling considerable more. Not all Americans realize that nationalization affected the holdings of only three major companies—Hochschild, Aramayo and Patiño—and that there are still more mines in private hands than under government control. Nor do all observers realize that the miners constitute a mere one per cent of the population; they are vocal and militant out of all proportion to their numbers, and they capitalize on the strategic importance of mining in the economy of the nation.

By breaking up the large feudal estates, reallocating land to the peasants, and abolishing the varied patterns of unpaid servitude, agrarian reform not only did away with the landlords as a privileged caste but also provided the peasant with a new sense of dignity and worth. Attempts to relocate peasants from the densely populated western highlands to the unsettled eastern frontier are only recently beginning to have some limited success.

Universal suffrage brought the peasant into active participation in national affairs and destroyed forever the oligarchy's monopoly on government. In terms of preparation for citizenship, a real start has been made in the area which is most important—the mass of peasants have come to esteem education, and to contribute their time, effort and limited resources in providing schools for their children.

No one can be indifferent to the M.N.R. revolution.<sup>4</sup> Some critics point to the economic losses of the nationalized mines, or to the continued problems of communication and transportation, and wonder how the immense amounts spent in United States aid sometimes totalling 30 per cent of the na-

<sup>4</sup> The bulk of the published literature is, unfortunately, merely polemic with exaggerated praise from partisans and scathing attacks from the opposition.



tional budget, could have left so little mark—not to mention the generous aid that has come from other countries and from the United Nations.<sup>5</sup> Others decry the totalitarian methods by which the M.N.R. suppressed opposition. Censorship was strict; a gestapo-like *Control Político* terrorized and abused “enemies of the party”; graft and political patronage (customary institutions in Latin America) were not acceptable on the scale practiced by the M.N.R. But one must look at change in a nation from the point of view of its own history, as well as in comparison with the contemporary development of other nations, or some abstract ideal.

Bolivia’s runaway inflation was finally held in check by abolishing multiple exchange rates, and imposing a series of fairly austere measures in December, 1956, when President Hernán Siles (who succeeded Paz) held the line against dissidents until the boliviano became stabilized at about 12,000 per dollar. Bolivian currency has held that value, while the country has been gradually shifting to a different unit of currency, the peso, which is worth 1,000 bolivianos.

An elaborate petroleum code encouraged private investment in the late 1950’s, and liberalized conditions also encouraged some foreigners to invest in mining enterprises. Peasants began to participate in the money economy at an unexpectedly high rate, and commerce has more than recovered from the depression that cast a shadow over the early years of the M.N.R. revolution. This is not to say that Bolivia is riding high on an economic boom, except in a relative sense; improvement has been enormous in comparison with the earlier situation, but Bolivia is still miserably poor in comparison with most other countries, even in Latin America.

By the time the 1964 elections came around, everyone except Victor Paz himself was restive about his assumption of a paternalistic role as the personification of the

revolution. Reelected in 1960, he had pressured congress into amending the constitution so that he could succeed himself, and felt secure enough to ignore the protests of even such veteran M.N.R. leaders as Juan Lechín and Hernán Siles, who eventually broke with him. Even the party congress rejected his proposed running mate, Federico Fortún, and named Air Force General René Barrientos instead. Presumably this was intended to serve as a demonstration that the armed forces were strongly on the side of the incumbent party, and thereby to discourage militant uprisings among the opposition.

It was already clear by the late 1950’s that the civilian militias could be used against as well as in support of the government. Lechín’s control over the miners was complete, and they presented a powerful bloc. At the same time, a few strong leaders had emerged among the peasants who turned towns like Ucucreña, Cliza and Achacachi into armed camps where they ruled supreme. In order to keep from drifting into a state of general anarchy, it appeared necessary again to impose some central control. On request, the United States provided equipment and training to restrengthen the armed forces. Although this temporarily consolidated the M.N.R.’s position, it was later to boomerang when the military leaders turned on Paz.

Other parties boycotted the elections in May, 1964, so that Paz retained the presidency, but in a climate of thinly veiled unrest. Soon there was active guerrilla fighting in the Oriente, apparently directed by the Falangists, the principal rightist opposition. This was the kind of hit-and-run harassment that did not aim at any confrontation with government troops, but served as a constant annoyance to them, and as a rallying point for the opposition. When the armed forces finally enforced a cease-fire, Paz had to admit his reliance on them.

Relations with the United States remained warm throughout the M.N.R. incumbency; despite Bolivia’s assertive independence in voting against the boycott of Cuba urged at Punta del Este in July, 1964. Only a few months later, it was the second nation in the

<sup>5</sup> The fundamental obstacles to economic development in Bolivia have changed little since they were critically analyzed in the “Keenleyside Report,” *Report of the United Nations Mission of Technical Assistance to Bolivia* (New York: U.N., 1951).

hemisphere to prepare a detailed ten-year plan for development, as was required for full participation in the Alliance for Progress. In August, 1964, Bolivia finally broke diplomatic relations with Cuba, ostensibly because Castroite agitators had been at the root of guerrilla uprisings in the east. In October, Bolivia also suspended relations with Czechoslovakia, asserting that the Czech embassy had been used as a base for subversion.

### "THE REVOLUTION OF RESTORATION"

Meanwhile, General Barrientos knew that he had not been Paz's choice, and he avoided close or sustained contact with Paz. In fact, he spent most of the time in his native Cochabamba, where he enjoyed strong local support. When he did speak out, it was more often in opposition than in support of the president. Late in September, it was reported that an antigovernment coup had been nipped in the bud, and Siles was among the many M.N.R. and Falangist leaders exiled, while Lechín went into hiding. A "state of siege" (similar to martial law) was imposed, as was censorship of the press. Barrientos called on Paz to lift censorship or resign; Paz's token removal of censorship, except in La Paz, was meaningless, because La Paz is the hub of news and communication for the entire nation. Miners and students were in the fore when violent anti-government demonstrations broke out in Oruro, Cochabamba, and other cities throughout the country. The killing of a student demonstrator in Cochabamba provided a rallying point for restless dissidents, and a memorial "March for Freedom" was countered by a demonstration of M.N.R. supporters in La Paz.

It was almost inevitable that fighting would ensue between the opposing factions, but Paz's force did not swell as he had hoped. In three days of confused skirmishing, it became clear that the armed forces were not disposed to defend the president. A crowd in Cochabamba proclaimed itself for Barrientos, who called on Paz to resign. In secret, Paz flew to asylum in Peru on the morning of November 4; his abrupt with-

drawal left many M.N.R. partisans surprised and defenseless, as a military junta assumed control of the government.

General Alfredo Ovando, commander-in-chief of the armed forces and a long-term confidant of Paz, served briefly as provisional president. But Barrientos was given a hero's welcome when he rushed to the capital, and Ovando and Barrientos declared themselves copresidents while announcing the victory of their "Revolution of Restoration" to the throngs gathered in front of the palace. Reacting to shouts of protest, they retired from the balcony and returned a minute later to declare that Ovando had magnanimously resigned in favor of Barrientos. The pattern was set for the confusion and power plays that were to follow during the junta's first year.

Censorship was abolished; commissions were established to investigate the crimes of the ousted regime; and all political parties were assured of freedom. Lechín emerged from hiding and led the miners to demand rewards for their part in the revolution. Siles returned from exile, having been "cleared" by his recent rift with Paz. Leaders of the 17 domestic parties that represent a broad spectrum of political ideologies wooed the junta, although many nations withheld diplomatic recognition until they felt certain that a countercoup could no longer be expected. The United States, for example, suspended all diplomatic relations and aid (except Peace Corps aid) for a full month, before resuming its relationships with virtually no change in approach.

There was considerable confusion of expectations among the Bolivians, too. Some interpreted the coup as presaging reversal of the social revolution and a return to "the military boot," oppressive domination by the army as guardian of the feudal oligarchy; peasants feared this as much as members of the "rosca" hoped for it. Indeed, during the early weeks some landlords returned to their estates and ineffectually demanded return of the land that had been reallocated to peasants, or sought payment for it. The bourgeoisie, by contrast, hoped that the coun-

ry could be "put back in order," and seemed in general to be relieved at the destruction of Paz's totalitarian machine, expressing the fervent hope that the junta would remain apolitical and foster a new climate of "work, discipline, and honesty."

Leftists took advantage of the confusion and stepped into a power vacuum left in the mining unions. Generally increasing labor unrest combined with mounting leftist agitation, after the junta banned strikes or layoffs until elections; the junta spoke of having inherited the fruits of anarchy sown by the M.N.R.

For several months, Barrientos wooed the peasants and the bourgeoisie. For the former, he affirmed that "the fundamental advances of the 1952 revolution are irreversible," and vowed to respect them, while at the same time disassociating them from the M.N.R. as such. He stumped through the country tirelessly, issuing land-titles and dedicating bridges, promising school buildings, and constantly reaffirming his concern for the masses. At the same time, there was a highly publicized (but generally ineffective) drive to disarm the civilian militias which had so long threatened peace and order, and revision of import regulations opened the way for freer commerce. When teachers struck, demanding higher wages, he held the line and insisted that the nation could not afford a general raise. The national mining enterprise was subjected to close scrutiny in the hope of establishing it on a sound financial basis. Throughout this time, the junta remained ostensibly apolitical, and Barrientos repeatedly disavowed any interest in running for the presidency in the open elections which had been promised for May, 1965.

## **ELECTIONS POSTPONED**

But a new political party, the Popular Christian Movement (M.P.C.) emerged in January in support of Barriento's candidacy. Elections were postponed until the end of September, and Barrientos declared his candidacy—supposedly acceding to a popular raft. He subsequently postponed elections until late October—and then indefinitely—

when a legal controversy raged over the requirement that he resign six months before he could run for reelection.

In mid-January, when a coup planned by the pro-Paz national police force was supposedly uncovered, many M.N.R. supporters were exiled, and the police force was reorganized. In the middle of May, Lechín was exiled on charges of fraud and dual citizenship. A general strike was called, and the junta promptly attempted to hamstring the labor unions by declaring all offices vacant and calling for union elections to be held a month later. Factory workers joined the miners in several days of violent open warfare which pitted the military against the proletariat, except for the peasants, who remained aloof. A new state of siege was declared; 200 supposedly Communist agitators were deported; and a series of decrees revamped the national mining enterprise, at a heavy cost to labor.

General Ovando played a major role in negotiating this truce, and was again named co-president. Some observers feel that he had been the strategist behind the scenes all along, and that this situation finally forced Barrientos to offer public recognition of his role. Whether this is true or not, Ovando and Barrientos make much of asserting their unanimity—even though it is difficult to imagine two more different men. Barrientos is a dynamic young man with a reputation for recklessness, whose quick rise through the ranks probably owes much to his having been personal pilot to Paz, whereas Ovando is a career soldier who enjoys a reputation for caution and astuteness. Whereas Barrientos' few political acts were always within the M.N.R., Ovando was a Falangist who joined the M.N.R. for expediency only after returning from one of Paz's concentration camps. While Barrientos obviously enjoys drinking chicha, the native corn beer, and addressing Indians in Quechua, Ovando is more reserved, in keeping with his aristocratic family heritage. Clearly, they share little more than the title of co-president and a conviction that the military junta should continue to govern their strife-ridden country.

In July, there was talk of instituting a "Second Republic," a drastic overhaul of the constitution, bureaucratic organization, and other aspects of government, but nothing has come of it. The junta announced that the nation "would not be ready for elections" for at least two years, and suggested that they were ready to delay twice that long if it seemed appropriate. Renewed fighting broke out in the mining areas in mid-September, and again it was put down by strong military action. More miners were killed, and more dissidents were deported. The junta was clearly willing and able to use force to retain control, and to risk the alienation of those who had hoped for an orderly return to constitutional government. The use of force as an immediate solution to long-term problems raises many questions, both at home and abroad.

### PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Another of the many paradoxes in the contemporary Bolivian scene is that of anarchy. Most Bolivians spoke of the period of M.N.R. rule as a period of anarchy, and looked to the junta to impose order. And yet these same Bolivians are relieved by the greater freedom of expression permitted under the junta and tell bitterly of the *Control Político* that ruthlessly suppressed opposition during Paz's reign. These apparently contradictory views are both true, and the difference depends largely on one's point of reference. If one speaks in terms of degree of control exerted by the central government in mines or rural areas, labor discipline, and the suppression of local "warlords," it is clear that the junta has extended the national presence and control. On the other hand, if one speaks in terms of freedom of the press, the cherished right to say what one wishes, and to dissent from the incumbent leaders, the junta has extended and expanded liberties on a grand scale.

<sup>6</sup> *Sindicatos* are peasant unions, originally organized by the M.N.R. for the distribution of political patronage. Through state and provincial federations, they extended control to the level of the individual ex-hacienda, but their power seems to have been in large part mitigated by the junta's nonrecognition of *sindicato* officers.

But it can be misleading to speak of "anarchy versus order," as many Bolivians do. There are feasible alternatives between the polar extremes of pandemonium and regimentation. Most Bolivians were pleased when the junta took a firm stand against miners and factory workers in April. They phrased their approval in terms of a "now-or-never" show of strength against dangerous subversive forces, and considered it a timely showdown that would consolidate the nation. Many of these same Bolivians, four months later, questioned official statements to the effect that fighting in the mining area was the work of Communist agitators; they feared that this was the junta's way of discrediting the opposition and scattering its leaders.

But neighboring countries do not need any more restless politicians than they already have, so the junta has begun to send dissidents to isolated areas within Bolivia. Although this provides an immediate relief to pressure in the factories and the mines, it may eventually create new problems with the emergence of guerrillas in precisely those areas that are most difficult to control.

Despite widely divergent attitudes toward the junta, Bolivians seem generally to believe that it will continue in power for some years to come. Many see the inauguration of Ovando as a sign that Barrientos is being eased out; others feel that Barrientos made this gesture to consolidate his position and keep Ovando so busy with affairs of state that he could not plot against him.

Opposition parties continue to be vocal but ineffectual. The M.N.R. is still the favorite party among the majority of peasants, because it "gave" them land, the vote, and a precious sense of participation in the human community. But the tight organization that was maintained through the *sindicatos* has been dissolved.<sup>6</sup> Paz lives in luxury in Lima; he may privately reminisce about the possibility of his returning to the presidency, but there is no sign that he is actively working toward that goal. Most observers feel that the abuses of his regime have been so blatantly exposed that he would hardly dare return, and point out that many of his former party associates



resent his having deserted them without warning in November.

Siles assumed leadership of the M.N.R., but some astute partisans feel that he was also too closely associated with the totalitarian aspects of the party machinery. Thus, as presidential candidate, they favor Victor Andrade, who served as ambassador to the United States during most of the M.N.R. incumbency. The Bolivian Socialist Falange (F.S.B.) was traditionally the strongest opposition party throughout the M.N.R. regime. It never fully recovered, however, from the disorientation that followed the murder (or suicide) of its forceful leader, Oscar Únzaga de la Vega, during an abortive revolution in 1959. More recently, there is dissension within the ranks stemming from a vacillating on-again-off-again alliance with the junta. Generally thought of as "the party of the rosca," the F.S.B. has no support among the peasants.

Lechín, who bolted the M.N.R. to found the Leftist National Revolutionary Party (P.R.I.N.), still enjoys support among the miners, but he seems comfortable in exile in Paraguay, while his supporters are constantly harassed by the military. Walter Guevara, another founder of the M.N.R., established his own Authentic Revolutionary Party (P.R.A.) in 1960 when he broke with Paz, but continues to have an unimpressive following despite his obvious astuteness. A multitude of other tiny parties, ranging from Trotskyite and Marxist to Christian-Democrat and Anti-Nationalist, comprise a splintered opposition that could never realistically hope to unseat the junta or either of the major parties.

In short, there seems little likelihood of a major political upheaval, and, although there may be some jockeying for power among members of the junta, it seems probable that Bolivia will be dominated by the military for some time.

The domestic implications of this are varied. The armed forces are no longer identified as the mailed fist of the oligarchy, but neither have they won the support of peasants and workers, who will long comprise

a pro-M.N.R. majority. To appreciate the devotion of the Bolivian masses to Paz and his party, we need only compare their present situation with that of 15 years ago.

As small as a peasant's house may be, it is probably larger than most peasant houses were before 1952. Nowadays, it is likely to have a second story, as well as a metal roof rather than straw, and may even have a window or two. A transistor radio brings music and news and the peasant may have a bicycle for long treks that used to be made on foot. More important, although intangible, is his new self-conception, beyond what any peasant would have dared to dream before 1952. To appreciate the meaning of feudalism, we must look beyond social institutions to the workaday behavior of individuals. Where peasants used to have to work without pay at least three days a week (and sometimes as much as five), they now have no such obligation. They are also relieved of the need to provide eggs, firewood, cheese and other goods for the landlord, and to work periodically at menial tasks in or around the manor-house. They are allowed to go to school, to carry arms, to own property, to vote—in short, they have "become" human beings, whereas they were previously treated as part of the realty, to be bought, sold, rented, or leased as appurtenances to an estate.

This is the gift of "Taita Paz" ("Papa Paz," as he is affectionately called); and the military men who overthrew him suffer the stigma of being traitors to their leader, even if they

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*Will President Leoni successfully transfer his government to a democratically-elected successor in 1969? The factors contributing to the growth of democracy in Venezuela are explored here.*

# Political Experiment in Venezuela

By ROBERT J. ALEXANDER  
*Professor of Economics, Rutgers University*

VENEZUELA IS PASSING through the second phase of what remains one of the most important political experiments in contemporary Latin America. This is an attempt to bring about needed social change and rapid economic development through political democracy. It has remained, since 1958, one of the principal challenges to totalitarianism in Latin America.

Venezuela possessed certain advantages which favored the development of a progressive democracy. By 1958, she had a relatively large per capita national income as a result of the exploitation of her vast oil reserves. She had a greater degree of social mobility than many of her neighbors. There was relatively little race conflict, and there was no longer an entrenched traditional landlord class, such as still exists in Peru or Ecuador or even parts of Colombia.

On the other hand, vast inequalities of wealth and income, the existence of a sizable landless rural proletariat, and lack of a tradition of political democracy have militated against the Venezuelan experiment in democratic social change. The country has been ruled by military dictators during most of its existence, and many officers of the armed forces have been skeptical of the right or the ability of democratically-elected civilians to run the country's affairs. Finally, the Venezuelan experiment has suffered from the fact that Castro-led Communists of the hemisphere

have chosen the country as one of their principal targets for attempted guerrilla warfare.

The first phase of the Venezuelan democratic experience was successfully concluded in March, 1964, when President Romulo Betancourt handed the presidential sash to his successor, President Raul Leoni. This was the first time in Venezuelan history that a democratically-elected president had ever turned over his office to a democratically elected successor.

Betancourt had succeeded in initiating an extensive agrarian reform. Through protection and government loans he had given strong impulse to industrialization. He had established the basis for a government-owned oil industry. He had doubled the number of youngsters in school, had established a system of apprenticeship training and had set up many new vocational schools to prepare skilled workers for the new industries.

He had won complete control of the armed forces, defeating four major attempts at a coup d'état against his regime, and had also defeated Communist attempts to overthrow him by urban terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Finally, he had maintained the structure of political democracy; the three branches of government had functioned more or less normally throughout his regime, and he had presided over freely and hotly contested elections to choose his successor.

There is no doubt that Betancourt's achievements made the task of his successor considerably easier. However, it is still far from easy to govern Venezuela, and President Leoni has needed all of his considerable political abilities to continue the work launched by his friend and predecessor.

## THE PARTY STRUCTURE

Betancourt and Leoni are both leaders of the *Accion Democratica* party. This is one of a group of "national revolutionary" parties which, during the last quarter of a century, have assumed the leadership of the movement for democratic social change in various Latin American countries. It was established in 1937, and had been in power once before, between 1945 and 1948, when it began much the same kind of program which it has been carrying on since its return to office in 1959.

In Venezuela, *Accion Democratica* is the oldest and best-organized political party. For 20 years it has dominated the labor and peasant movements, and it has considerable support in the middle class as well. However, in recent years it has lost the hold which it once had on the country's student movement, a fact widely expected to weaken the party in the decades to come.

In the election of 1963, the Christian Social party, popularly known as "Copey," emerged as the chief challenge to *Accion Democratica*. During the Betancourt administration, Copey had participated in the government in coalition with A.D. As we shall note further on, it is playing a key role as the major opposition party under Leoni.

The third largest party is the *Union Republicana Democratica*, headed by Jovito Villalba. It is a party of somewhat ill-defined ideology, generally on the left, but without any clear points of doctrine to differentiate it from *Accion Democratica*. Since its establishment in 1946, it has tended to be the refuge of those politicians who for one reason or another leave one of the other political groups.

The fourth party in size is the *Frente Nacional Democratico*. This is a new party, arising from the independent candidacy of

novelist-businessman Arturo Uslar Pietri for president in 1963. After the election, Uslar brought together many of those who had backed him in the campaign to form what may well prove to be the country's principal moderately conservative party.

In addition to these major parties, there are four minor groups which also have representation in Congress. Largest of these is the *Frente Democratico Popular* of ex-Admiral Wolfgang Larrazabal, who presided over the provisional government in 1958 right after the overthrow of dictator General Marcos Perez Jimenez. This party is a personalist group of doubtful ideology, and rather opportunistic behavior. Even smaller is the *Partido Nacionalista Revolucionario*, a split-off in 1962 from *Accion Democratica*, and probably doomed to disappear in the next election. There is also a breakaway group from the U.R.D., known as the *Vanguardia Nacionalista Revolucionario*, which has a few deputies. Finally, there is the *Partido Socialista Venezolano*, a very small group which has one deputy and a very small following in the labor movement and among the intellectuals.

The two parties of the extreme left have no representation in congress. Since the middle of 1962, when they led two revolutionary attempts against the Betancourt regime in the ports of Carupano and Puerto Cabello, they have been "temporarily" suspended from participating openly in political affairs. These are the *Partido Comunista Venezolano* and the *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria*.

The technique of government of President Raul Leoni differs substantially from that of his predecessor. Betancourt ruled with a stronger hand. As president, he listened to advisers but was not a party man, insisting on his own decisions even when they went against the ideas of the leadership of *Accion Democratica*. Leoni is much more a party president, conferring much more closely with A.D. party leaders in the formulation of policy—although he makes the final decisions on key matters. The *Accion Democratica* leadership has a much greater feeling of partnership in the administration under Leoni.

The two administrations differ in another important particular. Throughout his term, Betancourt relied for congressional and popular support on a coalition of *Accion Democratica* and Copey. However, Leoni has governed with an entirely different coalition, and Copey has assumed the role of the loyal opposition.

### A NEW COALITION

When first assuming office, Leoni formed a cabinet composed only of *Accion Democratica* members and independents. However, after very long and often tedious negotiations, he put together a new coalition of *Accion Democratica*, *Union Republicana Democratica* and *Frente Nacional Democratico* in November, 1964.

This alignment of forces in the government has several advantages. It gives the administration an ample majority in congress. Some people argue, also, that it brings into the government certain elements which (if they were in the opposition) might not restrict themselves to responsible and legitimate methods of opposing the administration.

However, this coalition has the obvious disadvantages involved in trying to persuade three very different parties to agree on matters of policy and patronage. The U.R.D., in particular, has the reputation for being particularly "hungry" for jobs, which fact has undoubtedly caused President Leoni many headaches.

The Copey has remained outside of the Leoni government. However, it is playing a peculiarly important role in the opposition. Under Betancourt, one of the government's great disadvantages was that it did not have an unequivocally loyal opposition. On the one hand, it was faced with the frankly subversive *Partido Comunista Venezolano*, M.I.R. and antagonistic military groups. On the other hand, the "democratic" opposition consisting of the U.R.D. and the split-off from *Accion Democratica* known as the A.R.S. was constantly involved in maneuvering with the extremists, and elements in both groups were widely suspected of conspiring to overthrow the regime.

There is no such suspicion of subversion by the Copey. The *Copeyano* leaders are convinced democrats. In addition, many of them have high hopes that their party will be able to win the presidential election of 1968 and thus are particularly anxious for those elections to be held. Whether or not they win in 1968, the *Copeyanos* and most other political observers are convinced that the eventual successor to *Accion Democratica* in the government, if the democratic system remain intact, will be the Christian Social party. On the other hand, its chances of surviving if the country reverts to a military dictatorship or succumbs to Communist insurrection, are no better than, if as good as, those of the *Accion Democratica*.

Hence the role of Copey as the loyal opposition to the Leoni government is of very great importance for the future of democracy in Venezuela. No democratic system can be secure unless both the group in power and the major elements in the opposition are equally willing to limit their behavior according to the rules by which democracy operates. Copey's willingness to do this will help to establish a tradition of democratic opposition as the Betancourt and Leoni regimes have begun to establish a tradition of democratic administration.

### LEFTIST FAILURE

The subversive opposition of the extreme left continues. The Communists and the M.I.R. received a very serious setback when the people turned out in overwhelming numbers to vote in the December, 1963, election in spite of threats by the extremists to shoot those who went to the polls. For some months after the election, the extreme leftists desisted from the urban terrorism in which they have been engaged during the previous year and half.

In assessing the causes for their failure, the Communist and M.I.R. leaders disagree substantially among themselves. One group in the M.I.R. high command, led by Domingo Alberto Rangel, urged publicly that the campaign of violence against the government be ended, and that the party return to democratic



ctivity and attempt to reestablish contact with the masses of the citizenry, who had been strongly alienated by the extremists' terrorist activities. A minority among the Communist party leadership, reportedly led by General secretary Gustavo Machado and ex-trade union leader Jesus Farias, took the same position as Rangel, although they did not publish any statements of their position.

However, the majority of the leadership of the two groups reached other conclusions. Although they agreed that urban terrorism—assassination of policemen, robbing of banks, incendiarism—had failed, and should be suspended, they did not agree that violence itself should be ended. Rather, they decided to switch from a concentration on urban violence to a serious attempt to mount a guerrilla war in the countryside.

As a result of this difference of opinion among the extreme leftist leaders, the M.I.R. has for practical purposes split into two separate groups. The pro-violence faction, led by ex-deputy Saez Merida, no longer recognizes Rangel and his associates as being party leaders. Since Saez Merida as well as the Rangel group remain in jail, the Saez Merida faction has not been able to hold a formal convention of the party to repudiate Rangel, but in fact there are two M.I.R.'s.

In the Communist ranks, where the tradition of iron discipline is stronger, there does not seem to have been such a split. However, it is reported that, in a recent underground plenum of the party, the pro-violence elements brought guerrilla leaders to the meeting to insist on the continuation of the guerrilla campaign.

### **GUERRILLA ACTIVITY**

The Leoni government has succeeded in limiting guerrilla activities so that they are a serious nuisance for the regime but are not a serious threat against it. Although at the beginning of 1965, the extreme leftists had "fronts" in the three Eastern Venezuelan states of Lara, Falcon and Portuguesa, by the middle of the year only the Lara guerrilla center remained active. Even there, the guerrillas had been so harassed by the army

that they could not establish effective control of any region for any length of time.

As things now stand, it is unlikely that guerrilla activity will be able seriously to undermine the Leoni regime in the immediate future. However, it is also unlikely that such activity will be completely eliminated unless the *Partido Comunista* and M.I.R. elements which are carrying it on conclude that they have nothing to gain by continuing their war against the government.

It is certainly obvious that whatever chance the extremists think they may have of eventual victory in guerrilla war, they have sacrificed a great deal in the shorter run. The Communist party, which once controlled a sizable part of the labor movement, was influential in professional organizations and was eminently respectable in the general political arena; has lost virtually all of its popular base, and is now cordially detested by many who supported it, or at least hesitated to attack it, a few years ago.

### **REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT**

The ultimate success of the democratic regime in dealing with the guerrilla menace undoubtedly depends in large part on the government's ability to go ahead with its program of reform and development. The Leoni government is doing exactly that.

It is going ahead with the agrarian reform. It has renewed the process of dividing up estates and giving land to the peasants. This had been suspended during the last months of the Betancourt regime because congress, in the control of the opposition, refused to grant funds for its continuance. Approximately 15,000 families have been given land since Leoni took office.

At the same time, the administration has engaged in a program of what it calls "consolidation" of the agrarian reform. It has paid more attention to building access roads and houses, providing marketing facilities, and taking other measures to assure that the recipients of land under the reform can become good farmers.

The Leoni regime has expanded the social security system. It has added retirement pen-

sions and other benefits to what was largely a health insurance program. Leoni's government has also turned its attention to a problem which was to a large degree overlooked by the Betancourt regime, that of housing. Both urban and rural housing programs are under way which, hopefully, will result in the construction of between 150,000 and 200,000 homes by the public housing authorities by the end of the Leoni administration.

These housing efforts have been aided by the revival of the private construction industry. During most of the Betancourt administration, this industry was in a state of crisis, as a result of the collapse of the speculative boom that had characterized the last years of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship. However, as a result of the return of confidence among private investors, resulting in large part from the ability of Betancourt to complete his term in spite of all the difficulties confronting him, private construction has again been booming.

Although most private construction is middle and upper class housing, it has not been unimportant for the more humble citizenry. It has in many cases meant that people moving into new privately constructed homes have vacated older structures which in turn can be occupied by people of somewhat more limited means.

The Leoni government has continued its efforts towards economic development. The national road network is being expanded and large irrigation projects are under way. The government-owned steel and petrochemical industries are now working at full capacity. Plans are being put into effect to expand their productive capacity, while private petrochemical firms are also being encouraged. The privately-owned automobile industry now assembles all cars sold in Venezuela, with about 50 per cent of the parts of cars now being made in the country. The government's Venezuelan Development Corporation has expanded its program of building factories which it rents (with an option to buy) to industrialists who establish new enterprises.

One of the most important aspects of the development program is the work being done in the Orinoco River Valley. There the ad-

ministration is going ahead with the construction of a new city, now called Ciudad Guayana, which President Betancourt once referred to as "the Pittsburgh of Venezuela. The public utilities are being put in the city the paving of its streets goes forward; an new industries are moving into the city and its environs. The Caroni River has been bridged, thus greatly facilitating the bringing of people and goods into the city.

The government is also going forward with what is probably the most important hydroelectric project in Latin America, the Guaiquer Dam, located a few score miles from Ciudad Guayana. The first stage of this project will be finished by the end of Leoni's administration, and it will ultimately have the capacity approximately to double the country's available electricity.

## OIL PRODUCTION

The petroleum industry, too, has contributed to the economic prosperity which has undoubtedly characterized the Leoni administration. Oil production has been mounting steadily, and since petroleum still provides the overwhelming portion of the country's exports, this fact has reflected favorably on the whole economy.

The Leoni regime has continued the Betancourt policy of encouraging the growth of the Venezuelan government petroleum firm to compete with the foreign firms now operating in Venezuela, and presumably to take over the operation of the Venezuelan oil industry when the foreign firms' concessions run out in less than 20 years from now. Leoni has reserved a sizable proportion of the Venezuelan internal market for this *Compania Venezolana de Petroleo*.

However, the development of the C.V.I. has been hampered by its inability to work out satisfactory arrangements for service contracts with private foreign companies to help it exploit those oil reserves which have been allotted to the C.V.P. This failure is due in part to the fact that there are certain issues pending between the foreign companies and the Venezuelan government concerning tax. Negotiations on this issue are in progress.

## FOREIGN POLICY

Leoni has also continued the Betancourt administration's foreign policy of general alignment with the West, at the same time seeking to determine its stand on any given issue in terms of the best interests of Venezuela and of the principles of support for self-determination and political democracy which have become the cornerstones of Venezuelan policy. This independent attitude was shown at the time of the United States incursion into the Dominican Republic in April, 1964. At that time, Venezuela was willing to contribute to an inter-American force in that republic if the terms of reference of that force did not involve a justification of the original United States invasion of the country. When the United States insisted on having the resolution authorizing the inter-American force contain such a justification for the United States action, the Leoni government opposed the resolution and sent no troops.

The Dominican situation contributed to a growing worry in democratic circles concerning United States policy in Latin America. There is growing fear that the United States is tending to rely principally on military force to stop the Communists and other extremists in Latin America, instead of on the program for economic development and social reform which President John F. Kennedy put forward. There is also fear, both among elements supporting the Leoni government and in the opposition, that such an attitude by the United States will encourage reactionary military men to overthrow progressive democratic regimes that are trying to deal with the problems which give the extremists a chance to agitate effectively.

The attitude of the Venezuelan military has inevitably remained a preoccupation of all democratic elements in Venezuela. However, the work of Betancourt in convincing military leaders of the need for and efficacy of civilian democratic rule, and of purging those who would not be convinced, has paid dividends for Leoni.

Although the Leoni regime has not been able to be complacent about possible ambitions of individual military leaders, it has not

been faced with the kind of crisis which plagued the Betancourt regime on several occasions. President Leoni reportedly has had no fear of a possible military coup.

One other major problem facing the Leoni regime has been the increase in the size of the government bureaucracy, and its continuing inefficiency. The increase in the bureaucracy has been due in considerable degree to the existence of a tri-party coalition. It has not been politically feasible to dismiss many of the government workers who had gained their posts due to the presence of Copey in the previous administration. So, in order to satisfy the patronage requirements of A.D.'s two coalition partners, it has been necessary to add new jobs.

The upshot has been that a considerably larger proportion of the budget now goes to the costs of administration than was true previously. This fact has aroused considerable criticism particularly among business elements who have supported the regime but feel that it is wasting important resources which might better be devoted to development projects.

Several factors will undoubtedly determine whether President Leoni can repeat the performance of his predecessor and turn the government over in 1969 to a democratically-elected successor. One will certainly be the general economic situation, which to a considerable degree still depends on the behavior of the oil industry. A second will be the general international climate. A steady drift towards military dictatorship elsewhere in

(Continued on page 367)

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*This specialist maintains that "Chile has the resources to provide a fairly abundant life for most of the people." He notes that "there are serious defects in the economic order," but he believes that President Frei is aiming at "fundamental changes within the framework of democracy."*

## The Chilean Dilemma

By W. DONALD BEATTY

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IN MID-SEPTEMBER, 1965, a leading editorial<sup>1</sup> offered both congratulations and commiserations to Chile as that nation prepared to celebrate its foremost national holiday, *Diez y Ocho*, or 18 September. It was on that date in 1810, equivalent to the Fourth of July, that the governing "junta" or council of Santiago in the captaincy-general of Chile decided to ignore the authority of the regency in Spain that superseded Ferdinand VII (who had previously been removed by Napoleon). Later, on February 12, 1818, independence was formally declared and assured by the victories of San Martín and Bernardo O'Higgins over Spanish forces at Chacabuco and Maipú. Thereafter, Chile began its course as an independent nation, an independence that was never again challenged seriously by Spain or any other power.

Congratulations can be readily offered to Chile for its achievements. Political stability came early with the adoption of the constitution of 1833, which endured until 1925. This charter of government provided for a unitary system of government with a concentration of power in the hands of the executive, although the document was modified with the passage of time to weaken the president and grant more power to the legislature. As other nations in Latin America rapidly drafted and discarded one constitution after another, with the military interfering frequently in civil

affairs, Chile modified its constitution in accordance with the provisions of the document itself, and the armed forces generally abstained from participation in politics.

Along with orderly government, there was substantial economic progress as mineral resources—nitrates in particular—were developed, and Chile then produced enough food to provide for her own people with a surplus for export. It has been contended that the economic progress was superficial and did not extend to the bulk of the people. While this is true, nonetheless, during the nineteenth and early twentieth century Chile presented a far more attractive picture than most of her sister republics.

As to the commiserations, they include more than a fair share of natural disasters. Chile has suffered violent earthquakes, in 1939, in 1960 and most recently in March, 1965. This last destroyed about 20,000 homes and caused damages to property as yet unmeasured. Then, too, incessant rains fell for four weeks in August, 1965, producing floods and landslides and leaving 25,000 people without homes. A major part of the grain in the Central Valley was destroyed, communications were interrupted, and buildings were damaged.

There are at the same time other problems which have existed for generations. However, before analyzing the long-range problems, some idea of the configuration and the resources of the "Long Land," the "geo-

<sup>1</sup> *The Latin American Times*, September 17, p. 4.



graphical monstrosity" which is Chile, is essential.<sup>2</sup>

### THE "LONG LAND"

That part of Chile located in South America totals slightly more than 286,000 square miles, meaning that Chile is somewhat larger than the state of Texas. Chile claims, in addition, a section of Antarctica which is double that of the continental area. This latter area is not an effective part of the country. Chile also possesses the Juan Fernández Islands lying in the Pacific, about 400 miles off the coast. Of little economic importance, in fact an economic dependent, is Easter Island, located about 2,500 miles west of Valparaíso. This island, granted local government only in 1965, is part of the Polynesian group. It may eventually have some attraction for tourists owing to the grotesque monuments placed there by an earlier civilization. It may also provide an air strip at a later date. Its inhabitants number about 1,000. At one time there may have been as many as 5,000 residents, but these were depleted as the island was raided to provide laborers for the guano islands of Peru. The island was claimed by Chile in 1888, and Chile then became the only nation in Latin America which claimed territory remote from its shores.

Chile today shelters nearly 8.5 million people, who range from the Europeans of several nationalities (Spanish, English, German, Italian) to the Indians—the Araucanian or "Mapuche"—who contribute about five per cent of the population. There are virtually no Negroes in Chile. The bulk of the people are mestizo, with the Indian strain prominent but not nearly so obvious as in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador. Common statistics indicate a high rate of literacy, perhaps 80 per cent, but this figure is misleading, for many of the 80 per cent who can write their own names and recognize them in print have limited understanding of the printed word. In Latin America, to be literate is not equivalent to being educated, as will be explained later.

The population is growing at the rate of about 3 per cent per year, which is about the average for Latin America. The population of the large cities is growing far faster than that of the rural areas, owing in part to migration from the country to the large metropolitan areas, not to the towns of moderate size, as formerly was the case. Hence, Santiago is one of the large cities of the world despite Chile's modest national population; the Chilean capital now numbers almost 2.5 million and that figure will be reached in the near future.

The climate varies from the arid north, which includes about one-third of the country, that part which lies north of Coquimbo, to the damp and foggy area in the vicinity of the Straits of Magellan. In the upper third, especially as one moves north, the expression, "not a tree, not a bird, not a blade of grass," is appropriate and accurate; such cities as Iquique and Arica have virtually no measurable rainfall throughout the year.

Farther south, in the middle section or middle third of Chile, the climate can only be described as delightful and ideal for most of the year. In the northern part of this third, there is inadequate rainfall for agriculture, and irrigation is necessary. Further south, there is adequate rainfall during the growing season. The "Valle Central," or central valley, which is the depression between the Andes and the coast range, is the arable section of the country, and it should be emphasized at this point that Chile has more arable land per capita than the United States—enough arable land to feed a population four times its present size. Today, however, Chile depends heavily on imports to feed her growing population.

The southern third of Chile, south of Puerto Montt, is the least attractive part of the country, with heavy rainfall, few towns, and sparse population. This third still contributes materially to the economy, with hardy crops of grain and potatoes, sheep and lumber and, in the region of the Straits of Magellan, the oil fields on which Chile depends, despite the fact that Chile is not self-sufficient in petroleum and its by-products.

<sup>2</sup> For background material see *Current History*, March, 1953, pp. 165 ff. and *Current History*, February, 1962, pp. 106 ff.

The major fields are located south of the Straits at Cerro Sombrero. In this southern third of the country, in addition to abundant rainfall, there are glaciers, ice fields and deep coastal inlets. The city of Punta Arenas, located on the northern side of the Straits of Magellan, has more than 60,000 people, supported by the oil industry and the various activities associated with the vast sheep ranches. There is no other city in the world of equal size located so far south.

### MINERALS AND INDUSTRY

While Chile is not rich in all natural resources, it is far more fortunate than some. The northern part of the country, especially that part farthest north, is rich in copper, which is controlled by the Anaconda Company, operating at Chuquicamata and at El Salvador. Together with the other copper mines in the nation, they yield about 600,000 tons of copper a year. In addition, there is nitrate which, although no longer so important as it was prior to 1920, still makes a substantial contribution to the national economy. Nitrate production has decreased from its most prosperous period; production today totals about 1,000,000 tons per year. Formerly, most of the nitrate was exported. Today—and this is a helpful sign—nearly one-half of the annual production is used at home to restore fertility to the exhausted soil. There are two large nitrate plants, one at Pedro de Valdivia and the other at Mariá Elena. Each of these is a Guggenheim property. A third and inefficient operation at Victoria is controlled by domestic capital and operated at a loss that is absorbed by the government to avoid the economic hardship which the people of the area would endure if the operation were terminated. There are other minerals, such as sulphur, and iodine, which is a by-product of the nitrate operations.

The port city of Arica should be identified, for this is the terminus of the railway that reaches into Bolivia and to which Bolivia has access. Within the last ten years, industry in Arica has been encouraged by the government of Chile, and today there are many

small factories which assemble automobiles and manufacture bricks, textiles, lumber and other products. This artificial or "hot house" operation has been developed, thanks to the support of the government, in an effort to reduce the concentrations at Santiago and Valparaíso. While it is easy to criticize, it must be observed that only after considerable study and concentration could any operation be found that is more awkward and inefficient than that of a Chilean sawmill.

Further south, but still in the northern sector, more minerals are found, especially iron (controlled by Bethlehem Steel) in the vicinity of La Serena. Most of this metal is exported to the United States, but some of it is sent south to a steel mill near Concepción, more specifically at Huachipato. There are other iron mines, controlled domestically, which export iron to customers all over the world, Japan providing one of the most reliable markets. Manganese and mercury are also produced.

The central third of Chile shelters about 75 per cent of the people of the nation, who are overwhelmingly urban rather than rural. It has already been mentioned that Santiago has a population of about 2.5 million, but Valparaíso and Viña del Mar together—and there is no distinct dividing line between them—have nearly one-half million. Concepción, further south, has 300,000, and the number would be greater if the surrounding towns were included. In this region of the country, there are many towns of 60,000 and more. This is Chile's agricultural center, producing the food on which this area and other parts of Chile must depend. The fertile soil yields all of the truck crops, the staples such as grains, rice and beans, the fruit which is unusually good, and grapes for the wine which is an essential part of every Chilean meal excepting breakfast.

This rich central area is also the industrial center of the country, for it is here that the textiles, other wearing apparel, foods and edible oils—in fact, the entire range of manufactured products—are to be found. Some of these are of good quality, but they are expensive. To the foreigner, prices may ap-

pear to be reasonable, but many of the items are beyond the reach of the average Chilean worker, whose daily income is about seven "escudos" or seven thousand pesos—less than \$2.00 per day.

The contributions of the southern one-third of the nation have been referred to. And there is one other area which is developing, finally, and which holds some promise for the future. This is the sea, especially that part which lies to the west of the northern two-thirds of Chile. The sea abounds in very good edible fish which should become a vital part of the Chilean diet, but to date this development has only begun. The corvina, the congrio, the sierra and other fish are abundant and can be caught easily, especially if new and modern equipment is available. The problems that confront the fishing industry are many, including the price of the fish when it reaches the consumer after passing through the hands of too many "middle men." In addition, there is the problem of refrigeration. The major problem is human. The Chilean has yet to learn that fish can be substituted for meat, and he must also learn how to prepare fish so that it is a welcome addition to the daily meal.

One resource from the sea has been exploited during the past 15 years and shows promise for the future. For centuries, the anchovy and other inferior fish just off the coast have been ignored, exploited only by the gulls and pelicans. Within the past decade and one-half, there has been a very substantial development in the fish meal industry, with the cooked and ground product providing food for livestock. Centers for this new and promising activity are Antofagasta, Iquique and Arica. To date, fish meal has been produced only for livestock, although some thought has been given to converting this product into cheap food for humans. Work has been provided for those who build and operate the ships and those who are employed in the various canneries

and processing stations. Chile lags behind Peru in this new field but, even so, the fish meal industry is a welcome addition to the national enterprise.

Other national assets might be listed. Highways in Chile vary from the very good—from Santiago to Valparaíso and the Pan Americana—to the very bad, meaning the rural arteries which are passable only during the dry season. The network of railways is adequate, although with few exceptions travel by train is hardly comfortable or attractive. Most people travel third class in coaches equipped with wooden benches and drawn by coal-burning locomotives. Much of the rolling stock is at least 40 years old. Airplane travel is available to those who can afford it, but air freight is expensive. The Chilean merchant marine is capable of moving coastal cargo efficiently and sails to foreign ports. In short, it would seem that Chile has the resources to provide a fairly abundant life for most of the people. Nonetheless, the fact is that there are serious defects in the economic and social order.

Among the obvious defects are the following.<sup>3</sup> Life expectancy at birth is about 40 years. According to Chilean figures of 1965, of every 1,000 children less than one year of age, 129 die each year of malnutrition. While Chile could produce virtually all of the food required to feed its people (with the possible exceptions of sugar, coffee, tea and a few other items) about \$140,000,000 was spent in 1964 for food that should have been produced at home. Part of the answer to this defect is provided by the following figures: in 1955 (conditions have not changed much since then) 92 per cent of the agrarian population received 34 per cent of the income from the land and 7.6 per cent received about 65 per cent of the income. There are about 151,000 farms in Chile; of these, in 1955, 10,300 had 65 per cent of the arable land while 116,150 small farms had only 13 per cent of the arable land. Many of the large properties are not cultivated intensively, and it is necessary to drive only 30 minutes or less from Santiago to find oxen dragging a wooden plow. In many of the rural areas,

<sup>3</sup> It must be remembered that about one-half of the earth's population is improperly fed, housed, and clothed. Conditions are far worse in parts of the Middle East, Africa, India, and so forth.

there is no provision for pure drinking water.

Public transportation in the cities, although cheap (about three cents per fare), is crowded and uncomfortable. More than one-half of the rolling stock of Santiago is not in operation, owing to the lack of repair parts. The public transportation authority loses money on each ticket. Since the busses are old and worn, the fuel is not burned as it should be, and downtown Santiago has an irritating problem of smog.

### THE "CALLAMPAS"

Probably the most apparent of the ills which beset Chile are the "callampas" (meaning mushrooms), or slums, found in all quarters of the larger cities, Santiago in particular. In vacant areas, with or without the permission of the owner, shelters are constructed of whatever is available, used lumber, tar paper, cardboard, tin cans, or whatever can be obtained without expenditure. Here about ten per cent of the people of Santiago live without running water, sewers, garbage disposal, schools, telephones, or police and fire protection—virtually without any of the conveniences that the more fortunate take for granted. Some of these people are probably utterly shiftless and know no other way to live. Others have moved from rural areas and have no alternative.

To compound the problem, a steady inflation has reduced the purchasing power of the peso. Perhaps the following example will suffice. In 1949, the dollar could be exchanged on the free market (which was then permitted) for about 95 pesos. As this is being written, the rate of exchange on the black market is 5,500 pesos or more to the dollar. This means that 55 pesos are required to buy one penny. According to the calculations of the government, the rate of inflation in 1964 was 38.4 per cent. There is some evidence that it was higher. Although Chile cannot be described as a wealthy country, a reasonable case can be made for the view that more people should lead more comfortable lives. Average per capita income is less than \$400.00 per year which means that those in the lower range

in income have very little on which to exist.

Another condition should be mentioned. The law of Chile stipulates that all children starting at age 7 shall attend school until they are 15 or until the first six years of training have been completed. The fact is that about 250,000 students are not in school for a variety of reasons—indifference, the need for another income to support the family, or no available school. The following figures were taken from the office of the ministry of education early in 1965. Of a given 500 students who start the first grade, only 250 finish the first six years as required by law. Of that 250, only 100 enter the next six years of "*humanidades*," and of that 100, only 50 finish. Of that 50, only 25 enter a university and of that 25, only one earns a degree.

### POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The political development of Chile must be compressed in an article of this scope. A turning point was reached in 1920 with the election of Arturo Alessandri, a member of the Liberal party who headed a coalition called the Liberal Alliance. He was elected by the narrowest of margins and then proposed sweeping reforms, which were stubbornly resisted by the congress until 1924–1925, when the military intervened. The reforms, including a new constitution, were then adopted, many of them without proper financial support or implementation. In the period that followed, Chile was perplexed with the loss of the market for nitrates and the depression. When the challenges of the depression had been met, World War II began, and stimulated the economy to some extent, because some of the resources of Chile, copper in particular, were in demand.

Immediately prior to the outbreak of World War II, a coalition effort brought to the presidency Pedro Aguirre Cerda, a member of the Radical party. He is best remembered for an agency which still exists in Chile, the Fomento Corporation, charged with the responsibility of drafting a blueprint for Chile to add both breadth and depth to the national economy and to take full advantage of the resources of the nation. Nothing of sub-

stance could be done until the war ended and the required technical assistance and financing from abroad could be acquired.

The Radical party continued in power until 1952. During its regime progress was clear and substantial. Plants were constructed to provide more electrical energy for all the nation. The steel mill at Huachipato was completed and placed in operation (1950).<sup>4</sup> Factories were constructed to convert the steel into finished products while another large factory started to convert refined copper into wire, pipes, and other items. Nonetheless, while there was progress, there was not enough. Inflation continued to plague the nation and economic development only kept pace with the growth of the population.

From 1952 to 1964, there were two presidents, each serving a term of six years, who grappled with national issues. The first was Carlos Ibáñez, and the second Jorge Alessandri, the son of that Arturo who had served from 1920 to 1925 and again from 1932 to 1938. Each was essentially an independent in his political affiliation although Alessandri was nominally a member of the Liberal party. Each worked at his job, but neither one was altogether successful. After all, it would be unreasonable to expect anyone to remedy all of Chile's ills in six years. Alessandri will always be remembered for his unostentatious walks to and from his apartment and the Moneda and his walk, again unescorted, from his apartment to attend the inauguration of his successor. He had been elected by a very narrow margin, but he left the presidency more popular than when he took the oath of office.

The campaign of 1964 was colorful and dramatic, because the two leading candidates were reformers but with different remedies for the ills which beset the nation. They

were Eduardo Frei, the candidate of the Christian Democrats, and Salvador Allende, the candidate of FRAP—a coalition of Socialists, Communists, and another left-wing group, the National Democratic party.<sup>5</sup>

Frei was well-known. He had been an editor, a former minister of public works, an author, a professor of labor law at the Catholic University, and a senator. He had been a candidate for the presidency in 1958, finishing third after Alessandri and Allende. Earlier, he had been one of the organizers of the National Falange, an offshoot of the Conservative party. The Falange eventually became the Christian Democratic party. Frei was active, articulate, devout, loyal to his wife and family of seven children, and an energetic campaigner. There is no question but that he had the support of the Catholic Church.

As a solution for Chile's problems, Frei proposed "revolution in liberty," or fundamental changes within the framework of democracy. He advocated participation by Chile in the operation of the mines then in production and other mines to be brought into production, but not nationalization.

In addition to participation in the copper industry, Frei advocated agrarian reform, which would create 100,000 new farm properties, a housing program which would provide 360,000 new homes in six years, schools for all, a reform in the tax structure, more copper refineries in Chile, expansion of lumbering and fishing, and an independent foreign policy.

The other leading contender was Salvador Allende, a physician by profession, a Socialist, who has been a candidate for the presidency three times. He ran second to Alessandri in 1958 and served in the senate for many years. He called for drastic measures including nationalization of the foreign copper companies. Differing from Frei, he supported Castro in Cuba.

There was a third candidate, capable Julio Durán, the candidate of the Radical party, who remained in the race even when it was apparent that he had no chance to win. His decision to remain in the race was probably

<sup>4</sup> Within the next year, the annual capacity of the plant will be doubled from about 300,000 tons to 600,000 annual tons. A convenient source for statistics is the *Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, published annually by the University of California at Los Angeles.

<sup>5</sup> FRAP is the abbreviation for *Frente de Acción Popular*.



prompted by the idea that no candidate would receive a majority and that the election would then be decided by the congress. There, the Radical party had considerable strength, and might have bargained for cabinet posts or other considerations in return for its support.

When the votes were counted on September 4, 1964, Frei had 1,409,012 votes, Allende 977,902, and Durán only 125,233. Frei received more than 56 per cent of the vote, Allende almost 39 per cent, and Durán was a very poor third with less than 5 per cent. Frei won with the support of his own party, and the votes of the Liberals, Conservatives, Radicals and independents who voted against Allende. Allende carried only a few provinces and those only by a narrow majority. Frei received 652,895 votes from the men in Chile and Allende only 593,770. From the women, Frei received 756,117 votes to 384,132 for Allende. In other words, the women of Chile gave to Frei his overwhelming majority, probably because they rejected Allende for his support of Castroism.

The inauguration in November was colorful, with delegations from 62 national and international organizations. The United States was represented by the late Adlai Stevenson. After the ceremonies, the dinners, the "coco-tels," and receptions, the new president began to send recommendations and proposed legislation to the congress. Opposition was prompt to appear with the Liberals and Conservatives quick to observe that their support of Frei in the campaign was not an endorsement of everything he had proposed. The members of FRAP had refused even to attend the inauguration.

It is possible that Frei deliberately sent many recommendations to the congress in order to influence the elections to the legislature in March, 1965. In other words, he may deliberately have forced the members of the congress to take a stand which would show the people of Chile that if they expected him to complete his program, they must give him legislators with whom he could work. Among the measures which he advocated were a streamlining of the legislative process so that once there was a consensus, he could

proceed with decrees to place the consensus in operation; he wanted the authority to appeal to the people in a plebiscite if there were a serious difference between the legislature and the executive; he asked also for a progressive tax on property to finance the various reforms, real agrarian reform, greater authority to provide jobs, social security, medical assistance, and education, new legislation pertaining to labor, authority to prevent public officials from remaining active in business while serving in high office, and a basic measure, the "Chileanization" of the copper industry. This plan called for government purchase of 25 per cent or more of the stock in established companies and 49 per cent of the stock in new companies, with the objective of increasing the production of copper (to 1,200,000 tons in six years) and swelling the flow of revenue into the treasury. To participate as President Frei wished, Chile would have had to find \$420,000,000.00.

With one exception, the congress refused to budge. When the president invited the heads of the various parties to consult with him, (there are 12 active parties in Chile) the leaders of FRAP refused to accept the invitation. Those who did discuss differences with the president yielded little if at all.

The only plan advocated by Frei which received wide support was that of "Schools for All." Under the supervision of the aggressive and competent minister of education Juan Gómez Millas, a census was conducted to locate children of school age. New schools were erected, many by private subscription and some by college students during their vacations. New teachers were trained in an emergency program, and those who had left

*(Continued on page 367)*

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*Although "At this point, it is difficult to classify the present regime as truly revolutionary," according to this author, there are encouraging signs that Brazilians are searching for "authentically Brazilian solutions to national problems."*

## Interim Regime in Brazil

By RONALD M. SCHNEIDER

*Visiting Associate Professor of Government, Columbia University*

MORE THAN 18 MONTHS have passed since a military-civilian uprising easily ousted João ("Jango") Goulart from the presidency of Brazil. Yet considerable controversy continues over whether in reality the events of April, 1964, constituted a revolution, a counterrevolution, or a mere military *golpe*. Until now any assessment of the 1964 change of regime as a "revolution" or "coup" has rested primarily upon the assessor's evaluation of the Goulart regime. Future analyses will come to be more heavily influenced by the record of the Castelo Branco administration. This article is intended as an interim balance sheet at mid-point in the provisional regime's scheduled three years in power.

The nature and orientation of the new regime seem to have been undergoing change from its very inception; at this juncture it appears to be something considerably less than the revolution proclaimed by its staunchest champions; very different from a counter-revolution as the term is commonly understood; and much more profound than the

"simple coup" sometimes suggested by its detractors.<sup>1</sup>

Brazil's complexity and diversity is such as to render generalizations about its problems difficult and to forbid the working out of solutions applicable to all parts of the sub-continent. For several decades, Brazil has been increasingly caught up in the process of transition from an agricultural country dominated by a near oligarchy to an economically-diversified nation with a broad base of popular participation in its political life. This process of modernization has been retarded not only by physical obstacles to national integration, but also by structural weaknesses in the country's political and social endowment, such as a high proportion of illiteracy, serious educational differences, widespread health problems, intractable regionalism, and the dominance of entrenched special interests. In spite of these, Brazil has made uneven progress toward modern nationhood and the development of a viable representative political system.

Acutely conscious of the country's vast economic potential and its remarkable rate of demographic expansion (with a population expected to reach 100 million by 1971), Brazilians have come to view the world in terms of their country as an emerging major power. At the same time their awareness of how far Brazil must yet travel has added urgency to their aspirations for rapid economic development.

<sup>1</sup> Although a very substantial analytical as well as descriptive literature on recent Brazilian developments is rapidly coming into existence, very little satisfactory material is yet available in English. Many of the points touched upon in the following pages are more fully treated in the present author's contributions to the Institute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems' recently published *Brazil Election Factbook*. The return of James Rowe to Brazil under the auspices of the American Universities' Field Staff should soon lead to useful reports in that organization's publications.

## MODERNIZATION

Sustained industrialization during the last two decades in southern Brazil has served to accentuate the differences between the relatively rich and advanced states (São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Guanabara, Minas Gerais, Rio Grande do Sul, and Paraná) and the rest of Brazil. Industrial development has been marked by chronic balance of payments difficulties and progressive inflation, which successive governments have proved reluctant to curb for fear of restraining business expansion and slowing the rate of economic development. Thus, while the process of modernization has carried Brazil part way along the road toward becoming an urban industrialized nation, it has also produced acute socio-economic dislocations and serious strains on the political system.

New groups have been brought into the political arena, diversifying and expanding the electorate. Urban industrial, commercial and financial elements have largely won national political control from the conservative landowners, who still dominate the internal politics of many states, particularly in the north and the interior. A rapidly growing urban middle class is gaining in political strength through its capacity for political leadership, its importance in the burgeoning bureaucracy, and its dominant position in the communications media. Urban labor is also an increasingly important element on the political scene, although its significance rests as much in its susceptibility to political manipulation as in its yet minimal capabilities for independent action.

Although the conservative landowning class is still strongly represented in the government, professional men and representatives of the powerful urban industrial, financial and business interests hold a majority of high-level executive posts and seats in congress. Moreover, the new generation of political leaders and government officials, who are beginning to occupy important positions, are more representative of the middle class. However, poor communications, absence of widely-circulating press media, the regional nature of much of Brazil's political life, the

extremely fragmented party system, and the lack of groups adequately defending middle-class interests have so far hampered the development of this class as a cohesive political force.

The fundamental social, economic and political changes which have taken place since 1930, so noticeable in the cities, have not yet penetrated into the rural areas where the majority of the Brazilian population continues to live. In the cities, political participation is open to all except the relatively few who are excluded by a literacy requirement for voting whereas, in large areas of rural Brazil, effective participation in politics is still restricted to a small number of landowners and local party chiefs. Thus Brazil's rural laboring population is largely excluded from an effective role in normal political activities. With improved communications and the increased activity of extremist agitators, rural unrest has mounted in recent years and, in spite of temporary interruption, will continue to do so unless meaningful reforms—economic, social and political—are instituted.

The discontent of urban laborers and of the awakening rural workers has been manifest in a tendency to listen to (if not necessarily to follow) those who offer radical solutions to the nation's problems. Even the traditionally moderate middle sectors have grown restless in recent years. For, during the postwar period, there has been a revolution in the aspirations of the Brazilian people. Although most of the population enjoys—albeit to widely varying degrees—material and social advantages previously unknown, a climate of frustration has stemmed from the widening gap between what they have and the mode of living to which they feel entitled.

In many respects, Brazil's political development has lagged behind economic progress or even social advances. The country is now going through a crucial period of accentuated political change involving important and difficult adjustments in the relative positions of its power groups. In 1962–1964, it ran into real trouble in this regard. The problem is complicated by the fact that, at this stage in

the development of Brazilian nationalism, domestic and foreign policy issues have become more closely linked. From the mid-1950's through 1964, Brazilian governments became acutely sensitive and increasingly responsive to popular sentiment in relation to the country's international position. The present administration's apparent disregard of this concern results from its leadership by individuals long involved with national security affairs and from its provisional, non-elected character. Greater agreement has been developing for the idea that Brazil's national interest should be the principal concern directing policy; but consensus on what constitutes the "national interest" remains far over the horizon. Moreover, there are few countries today where major economic decisions are so much at the center of the political process.

Under the Goulart regime (1961-1964), the growing forces of the left tried to wrest control from the dominant center-conservative elements, while improved political communications and radical agitation aroused strong pressures for sweeping changes in the established order. Although the increase in the number of radical leftists in policy-making positions in the Goulart regime led to great concern, much of this development could be viewed in terms of redressing a balance which had long been heavily overweighted in favor of the traditionally dominant élites. Peaceful incorporation of emerging groups in the past helped Brazil avoid violent political upheaval, and gradual, but fairly rapid, broadening of the political base (there has been a doubling of the Brazilian electorate between 1950 and 1962) cannot help but bring in its wake a change in the composition of the policy-making élite. A new political generation may well push to the fore by the 1970's—its emergence cannot be delayed far beyond that date.

If any lesson can be drawn from Brazil's

political history, it appears to be that although change or reform do not come without tension, and even strife, those already seated at the political banquet table eventually, if reluctantly, make room for the clamoring new arrivals. While this justifies reasonably restrained optimism that evolution toward a more broadly based representative democracy can continue, conflicting pressures are probably greater than those which have been accommodated successfully in the past, and Brazil may have to cope with still more serious political tensions in the next few years. Although the revolution of March, 1964, brought a temporary halt to the turn to the left, it has not yet provided any permanent solutions. Analysts of the Brazilian situation reach various more or less pessimistic conclusions concerning the prospects for democratic political development in Brazil.<sup>2</sup> Certainly the strengths and vulnerabilities of the Brazilian system are rather finely balanced, with the country's continued economic growth a critical factor in keeping unrest there from reaching an explosive level over the next few years.

The 1964 revolution was in a very real sense only another step in the zig-zag chain of Brazilian political life. This chain has extended from the 1930 revolution which brought Getúlio Vargas to power, through the 1945 revolt which ousted him and the *golpe* against him during his second term (1951-1954) which led to his suicide. And, it has threaded its way through the regime of Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), the election of Jânio Quadros in 1960, the succession crisis of August-September, 1961, precipitated by Jânio Quadros' abrupt resignation and the assumption of the presidency by Goulart.

Mistrust of Goulart, a prominent Vargas supporter, who was vice-president under Kubitschek and under Quadros, lay at the root of each of the four military interventions into politics in the 1954-1965 decade. Under these circumstances and given the magnitude of the problems to be faced in Brazil, the administration of the "accidental" president was perhaps all but doomed to be a total disaster. While in the final analysis President

<sup>2</sup> For example, see the essays of Reverend Brady Tyson (a missionary and teacher in São Paulo): "Why Brazil is so Difficult to Govern Effectively" (October, 1964); "The Continuing Brazilian Crisis" (May, 1965); and "Is Castelo Branco the Brazilian de Gaulle?" (July, 1965).

Goulart contributed heavily to his own difficulties, he encountered a number of very cruel dilemmas which would have sorely tested a much more able leader.

### THE NEW ADMINISTRATION

For an understanding of the present situation, attention must be paid to the events which transpired during the nine days which elapsed between Goulart's flight into exile and Castelo Branco's inauguration. On April 2, senate president Moura Andrade declared the presidency vacant and chamber president Raneiri Mazzilli became acting president of the republic (as he had in August, 1961). Congress failed to move effectively into the power vacuum, and the three military ministers, acting as a self-proclaimed "Supreme Command of the Revolution," on April 9 promulgated an extraordinary "Institutional Act." This revolutionary document temporarily overrode or set aside a number of provisions of the constitution. The most sweeping and arbitrary powers which it bestowed on the provisional government were to expire within a reasonably short period of time; those which merely strengthened the hand of the executive with respect to congress were to last until January 31, 1966.<sup>3</sup> Congress then chose Army Chief of Staff Humberto Castelo Branco as president and Social Democratic congressman José Mariá Alkmim as vice-president.

When it took office on April 11, 1964, the Castelo Branco administration initially felt impelled to continue in the direction indicated by the supreme command of the revolution and its Institutional Act. Basing its actions on the need to clear away all vestiges of "communism and corruption," the regime cancelled the mandates of 112 holders of elective offices including (in addition to Goulart) Governors Plínio Coelho of Amazonas, Aurélio do Carmo of Pará, Miguel Arrais of

Pernambuco, Seixas Doria of Sergipe, José Augusto de Araujo of Acre, and Badger Silveira of the state of Rio de Janeiro, as well as then Senator Juscelino Kubitschek and some 46 federal deputies (along with a score of alternates). Moreover, before the extraordinary provisions of Articles 7 and 10 of the Institutional Act expired in October, 1964, some 4,500 federal employees and roughly the same number of state and local bureaucrats were removed from their jobs. Several hundred officers of the armed forces were retired or dismissed, while nearly 400 individuals, including most of those removed from elective office as well as ex-President Quadros and Planning Minister Celso Furtado, were deprived of their political rights for 10 years. In November, the federal government used its constitutional power of intervention to remove Governor Mauro Borges of Goiás for alleged involvement in subversive plans.

During this initial phase of the "revolution," Communist-infiltrated student groups and labor unions were also subjected to closer government supervision. Nearly 600 special investigations of Goulart era organizations and activities were authorized and, through a constitutional amendment approved in July, 1964, Castelo Branco's term was extended to March 15, 1967. Overriding priority was given to a drastically deflationary program devised by Planning Minister Roberto Campos, and several of the more nationalistic economic measures of the Goulart administration were repealed. With Castelo Branco's government appearing to have little interest in public opinion and the "hard line" military leaders speaking out at will, 1964 closed without much sign of renovation or reform.

If the reactionary aspects of the "revolution" stood out most clearly during 1964, the past year has increasingly brought to light its renovating facets. Indeed, more has perhaps been accomplished in the area of institutional reforms in 1965 than in any comparable period since the dismantling of Vargas' *Estado Novo* in 1945-1946. As approved by congress in the fall of 1964, President Castelo Branco's agrarian reform program in-

<sup>3</sup> This latter date coincided with that for inauguration of the constitutional president originally scheduled to be elected in October, 1965. Authorization to strip "corrupt" and "subversive" individuals of their political rights was restricted to 60 days, and suspension of tenure guarantees to holders of elective or appointive governmental office was limited to six months.



luded a constitutional amendment authorizing payment in short-term government bonds or lands expropriated, a land tax aimed at encouraging fuller utilization of agricultural resources, and provisions making possible large-scale redistribution of under-utilized states. In April, 1965, the president marked the first anniversary of the revolution with a series of decrees implementing major provisions of the land statute and other agrarian legislation, but many Brazilians remained openly skeptical of the government's desire and ability to move far in this direction.

### LECTORAL REFORM

Concern over the manifest weaknesses of the party system and flaws in the electoral process led the administration to give high priority to reform in this field. As early as May, 1964, President Castelo Branco called for new legislation which would *inter alia* limit the influence of economic power and political patronage on the electoral process. On July 15, 1965, a new electoral code, a political party statute, and a sweeping "ineligibilities law" were all promulgated. Fundamentally, the modifications introduced into the existing party and electoral system would work in favor of wider and more effective political participation. The basic aims of the new measures are: 1) to reduce the number of political parties by sharply raising the minimum requirements for membership and geographic distribution; 2) to insure greater internal democracy by increasing the degree of supervision and control over internal party affairs by the electoral courts; 3) to strengthen the position of local party organizations relative to that of state leaders; 4) to foster party responsibility by severely restricting alliances; 5) to limit the very prevalent practice among politicians of switching from one party to another or of shifting constituencies between elections; 6) to strengthen party discipline by moving away from the extreme preferential vote in legislative elections.

The selection of candidates is henceforth to be through court-supervised primaries and representative conventions, not directly by

party leaders. Moreover, residence requirements for candidates for electoral office have been set up for the first time. While the new laws seek to encourage "closer links to the creative forces of society" through increased emphasis upon grass-roots democracy and civic education, adequate mechanisms for ensuring that this takes place have not yet been established.

The administration also had under active consideration a number of rather fundamental modifications of the existing system of political institutions. A joint congressional commission in August, 1965, began hearings upon bills which would 1) modify the judicial power by adding to the membership of the supreme court (thus giving the administration a firm majority) and strengthen the hands of the military courts in matters affecting national security and subversion—both broadly defined; 2) alter the functioning of congress by making permanent the provisions of the Institutional Act which require prompt action on presidential bills; by facilitating delegation of legislative powers; and by allowing greater latitude to the executive in the area of implementing decrees; and 3) transform the executive-legislative relationship by instituting parliamentary government or a uniquely Brazilian system which would give the president greater powers in many fields while strengthening congress' authority in other areas.

Until October, 1965, the Castelo Branco regime's political position in Congress was based on an inter-party Revolutionary Parliamentary Bloc (B.P.R.) built around the generally center-to-conservative National Democratic Union (U.D.N.), traditionally Brazil's opposition party; a sizable faction of the Social Democratic party (P.S.D.), which has in large part been composed of traditional rural political machines; a minority of the Brazilian Labor party (P.T.B.), which had by 1964 become to a distressing degree the personal political vehicle of Goulart; and a majority of the congressional representation of Brazil's 10 lesser parties. Factionalism, which has long been extreme in Brazil's fluid and undisciplined party system, has been

accentuated by differences among major leaders toward the 1964 revolution and the Castelo Branco regime. Thus, Governor Carlos Lacerda of Guanabara, while still the presidential nominee<sup>4</sup> of the U.D.N., was one of the most bitter critics of the administration which his party otherwise solidly supported.<sup>5</sup> And, although the government deprived Juscelino Kubitschek, P.S.D. leader, of his political rights, a majority of the P.S.D. federal legislators regularly voted for its projects. Even the P.T.B. leadership has been divided between those who oppose and those who cooperate with the administration.

### GUBERNATORIAL ELECTIONS: 1965

Critics of the government doubted that it would actually hold the gubernatorial elections in 11 states scheduled for October, and "hard line" elements within the military questioned the wisdom of permitting such balloting at a time when the full brunt of deflationary policies were being felt by the populace. Nevertheless, Castelo Branco insisted that these elections should be held as a step toward constitutional normalcy. But with the revolution of 1964 as perhaps the most important political issue, the administration had such a significant stake in these races that its influence was brought to bear against certain categorically antirevolutionary candidacies. Its major weapon in this respect was the "law of political ineligibilities" enacted in July, which barred from participation many members of the Goulart administration as well as some close associates of the deposed governors.

By far the greatest interest was centered upon the contest in Guanabara where a defeat for Governor Carlos Lacerda's candidate temporarily ended Lacerda's quest for the presidency. Since Lacerda himself had won less than 40 percent of the vote in the three-way contest of 1960, the prospects for the

electorally untested Flexa Ribeiro, his hand-picked choice for a successor, were never to bright. The P.T.B.'s first choice, Hól de Almeida (minister of transportation under Goulart) was ruled out under the ineligibilities law, and the subsequent selection of Marshal Henrique Lott failed to meet newly imposed residence requirements. With no real alternative to supporting P.S.D. nominee Francisco Negrão de Lima, a close associate of ex-President Kubitschek, the P.T.B. also contributed to Negrão's subsequent victory.

In the populous state of Minas Gerais, incumbent Governor José de Magalhães Pinheiro also sought to ram through the election of one of his family, Roberto Resende. The P.S.D. countered with the nomination of Sebastião Paes de Almeida. When the latter was disqualified by the electoral courts on the grounds of alleged "abuse of financial power" in his 1962 congressional campaign, Ismael Pinheiro, a political stand-in for Kubitschek, gained an impressive victory. While both of these elections can be viewed in large part as expressing the electorate's dissatisfaction with the present administration, there are also reasons to believe that the Castelo Branco regime takes no little consolation from the serious political defeats suffered by Lacerda and Magalhães Pinto, both of whom had become troublesome critics of the government.

In Paraná, the third important state in which elections were held, the candidate of incumbent Governor Ney Braga handily defeated the P.S.D.-P.T.B. standard bearer, and in Pará the "revolutionary" candidate, Major Alacid Nunes, trounced the long-entrenched P.S.D. machine. In Goiás, the nominee of the U.D.N. (who was supported by the "hard-line" military governor) narrowly defeated the candidate backed by the father of ousted Governor Mauro Borges. The U.D.N. candidates also won Paraíba and Maranhão, while the P.F.D. was victorious in Santa Catarina, Mato Grosso, and Rio Grande do Norte. In Alagoas, no candidate received an absolute majority.

Following the U.D.N. losses in the October 3 gubernatorial elections and the almost simultaneous return to Brazil of ex-President

<sup>4</sup> Lacerda withdrew from the presidential race on the defeat of his party in Guanabara in the October, 1965, elections.

<sup>5</sup> The U.D.N. furnished the government with its chamber president, majority leader, leader of B.P.R., and chief parliamentary whip as well as several cabinet members.

Kubitschek (self-exiled for 16 months), the Castelo Branco regime undertook a reorganization of its political base. Juracy Magalhães, ex-Governor of Bahia and president of the U.D.N. during 1957–1959, was recalled from his post as ambassador to the United States to take over as minister of justice and administration political coordinator—and perhaps to become the revolution's presidential candidate.<sup>6</sup>

Soon afterwards, on October 27, 1965—with his regime facing defeat in Congress as a result of the election and over a series of constitutional amendments required by the military—Castelo Branco consolidated his position. He decreed a second “Institutional Act” which dissolved the 13 political parties, increased his presidential powers and the size of the Supreme Court, and provided for indirect election of the president by the present Congress. This new act is to expire on March 15, 1967, with the inauguration of the new president. What will result politically from this, and from the subsequent plans to establish an official “Party of the Revolution,” remains to be seen.

On the economic and social fronts, the ultimate impact of the “revolution” is even less clear. Stabilization under the Roberto Campos-Octavio de Bulhões program has begun to take hold, but its ultimate success is still far from assured.<sup>7</sup> At the same time there are many indications that greater emphasis on development goals and reforms designed to rationalize and modernize the Brazilian economy will mark the second half of the Castelo Branco administration. Similarly, it appears possible that implementation of agrarian reform will get off the ground, at least on a selective basis in critical areas, during 1966. Until this occurs and some

relaxation on wage policy takes place, the administration will continue to lack popular support.

The 1964 revolution did not wipe away the efforts of a decade of intensive propagation of the theme that foreign investment has bled rather than enriched the country. Nationalistic legislation of the Goulart period was not just the work of leftists who have subsequently been forced to the margin of political life by the revolution. Many Brazilians harbor doubts that the purchase of United States-owned public utilities (at a price felt to have been highly favorable to the companies concerned) and the relaxation of limitations on the remittance of profits by foreign firms were in the national interest.

While the maintenance of close and comfortable relations with the United States without sacrificing independence of action has become a widely accepted goal, some Brazilians wonder whether the Castelo Branco government has gone too far in adopting a pro-United States stance. The tendency to blame many of Brazil's problems upon the United States is still deeply rooted in significant elements of the Brazilian body politic.

At this point, it is difficult to classify the present regime as truly “revolutionary” or conclude with assurance that it will evolve in that direction. Relative to past regimes, however, it is a strongly rationalizing, at least

(Continued on page 369)

<sup>6</sup> Magalhães, a former general, had been considered by Kubitschek as a possible centrist unity candidate in 1960 to head off Quadros and subsequently was mentioned as a probable running-mate for Kubitschek in 1965.

<sup>7</sup> Tax receipts have risen sharply as has new foreign investment, while the cost of living has gone up about 40% during the first 9 months of 1965 as compared to 60% for the corresponding period last year. At the same time there is an alarming degree of unemployment and a recession in the construction and durable goods industries.

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*Noting that "The armed forces seem to hold the key to the future in Argentina, because they can easily step in and overthrow the government," this specialist points out that, nonetheless, the "military has a dislike for direct rule."*

## Argentina: Reconciliation with the Peronists

By SAMUEL L. BAILY

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SEPTEMBER 16, 1965, was the tenth anniversary of the overthrow of former Argentine dictator Juan D. Peron. Ever since that overthrow, the country has been struggling to determine what to do with his followers. General Pedro Aramburu, provisional president from 1955 to 1958, utilized a series of repressive measures in an attempt to destroy the Peronists as a political force in the country. Arturo Frondizi, president from 1958 to 1962, attempted to seduce the Peronists with the prospect of limited political power and in this way to make them loyal supporters of his political movement.

During the past 10 years, the Peronist candidates have been allowed to participate only once in national elections—in 1962. In that year, all the seats in the chamber of deputies and in the senate plus all the provincial governorships were at stake. The old Saenz Peña law permitted the Peronists to sweep the elections with only 35 per cent of the vote, because in each province the party with the largest plurality automatically received two-thirds of the contested seats. Thus, the Peronists won control of 10 provinces, including the important province of Buenos Aires, plus a substantial bloc of 46 seats in the chamber of deputies and a number of senate seats. However, the armed forces promptly annulled the elections in a move to prevent the Peronists from obtaining significant political power.

President Arturo Illia, who took office on

October 12, 1963, adopted a new and more promising approach to the Peronists, permitting and encouraging them to become part of the institutional structure of the country, with the same rights and privileges as any other political party. There is no guarantee that this policy will be any more successful than those of previous administrations. The armed forces still are reluctant to see the Peronists gain any significant political power and can easily intervene at any time to prevent this. But the events of 1965 suggest that the Peronists are beginning at last to find a home within the political structure of the country and that Argentina may be progressing toward a new stage of political stability that will permit more resolute attempts on the part of her governments to solve her grave financial problems.

On December 2, 1964, Perón flew from exile in Spain to Brazil on his way back to Argentina. This act was the culmination of a year of Peronist activity—including the temporary seizure of factories and communications facilities as part of a "Battle Plan" designed to embarrass and weaken the government and to return the Peronists to power. They apparently believed that Perón's return or even his presence in neighboring Brazil, Uruguay, or Paraguay, would stimulate popular uprising in Argentina and lead to Peronist take-over.

These hopes were quickly destroyed. As

ording to a plan previously worked out by the Argentine and Brazilian foreign ministers, Perón was detained in Rio and returned to Spain on the next plane. The news of Perón's attempted return amused many Argentinians, but it did not provoke anything resembling a widespread popular uprising.

The embarrassed Peronist leaders offered a series of conflicting explanations of Perón's strategy and objectives. Some said he had attempted to return because of his pledge to do so before the end of the year. Others suggested that he had planned to go to Asunción, Paraguay, to await developments and from there he had planned secretly to return to Argentina. Still others indicated that the return was part of Peron's psychological warfare campaign against the Illia government and was designed simply to create a disturbance.

Although all three explanations are probably partially accurate, the last one seems most nearly correct. Perón's objective must have been to provoke trouble, because it was inconceivable that he or anyone else would believe that he would actually return. Brazil and Uruguay, where his plane was scheduled to stop, had announced prior to his trip that he would not be granted entry. Paraguay had also said he could not land there. And even if he had managed to reach Buenos Aires, he would have been arrested on earlier charges of statutory rape and at the very least would have been expelled from the country.

Regardless of his reasons, Perón's attempt to return made it clear that his presence would not cause even a large riot, let alone a revolution, and the realization of this fact by the local leaders led to a significant change in their general strategy for regaining power. During December, 1964, and January, 1965, the various sectors of the party debated their future role in Argentina and decided that henceforth they would seek to unite the fragmented movement within a single political party and that they would work within the existing political structure of the country. The first specific indication of the new Peronist strategy was the party's decision to participate in the imminent national elections.

## THE MARCH ELECTIONS

In the elections of March 14, 1965, the Peronist Unión Popular and the provincial Peronist parties won a combined total of 3,263,000 votes or approximately 36 per cent of the total while the government party, the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo, won only 2,645,000 votes or approximately 29 per cent of the total. In the contests for 99 of the 192 seats in the national chamber of deputies, the combined Peronist forces won 44 seats, increasing their number from 17 to 52, and the government party won 35 seats, increasing its number from 71 to 72. The remaining 20 seats were divided among a half dozen other parties.

These elections were significant for a number of reasons. Most importantly, the armed forces did not interfere. They not only permitted the Peronists to run their own candidates, but they also permitted those elected to assume their posts.

A number of circumstances had changed the military's position. In 1965, the stakes were not so high; only half the seats in the chamber of deputies were contested. In addition, the electoral laws had been changed. A new system of direct proportional representation begun in 1963 provided that the party with the largest plurality (the Peronists in many cases) no longer automatically received two-thirds of the contested seats in each province. The new system made it impossible for the Peronists to repeat their 1962 triumph. And finally, there was a strong feeling on the part of Illia and many others that there could be no enduring political stability or progress in Argentina so long as the large Peronist block remained proscribed. The combination of these factors most likely led the armed forces to permit the Peronists to run and to assume office for the first time since the overthrow of Perón. The 1965 elections were the freest in many years.

The March 14 elections were also significant because they made the Peronists the major opposition party in the country and provided them with an effective institutional means by which to seek their goals. With 52 seats in the chamber of deputies, the Peronists



were second only to the government party, which had won 72 seats. Although the government party kept nine congressional committee chairmanships for itself, including those of the important committees of foreign affairs, defense, finance and budget, it did grant the Peronists the chairmanships of eight committees. With these posts, the Peronists could exercise considerable influence over government policy.

And finally, the March elections were important for Argentina because they indicated that a new political alignment, polarizing the electorate around the government party and the Peronists, might be emerging to replace the chronic political fragmentation of the past. In 1963, President Illia was elected with only 25 per cent of the popular vote, the combined Peronist forces won 23 per cent of the total, and the Intransigent Radicals of former President Arturo Frondizi won 16 per cent. In 1965, however, only the government party and the Peronists won substantial percentages of the vote and both these groups increased their share of the total. The combined Peronist forces won 36 per cent and the government party 29 per cent. The other 35 per cent of the vote was divided among nearly a dozen parties with no one party receiving more than 6.3 per cent. If this trend toward polarization continues it will most likely bring stability to the Argentine political situation.

### THE PERONISTS UNITE

The failure of their 1964 obstructionist campaign, Perón's disastrous attempt to return, their success in the March, 1965, elections, and the government's policy of reconciliation caused the Peronists to begin to unite their fragmented movement to increase their political power by democratic means. Their efforts, however, were complicated by the fact that their movement was divided into a number of sectors with somewhat different interests. The most powerful and influential sector was the "62" Peronist unions, formerly led jointly by August Vandor and Andres Framini and, since July, 1964, by Vandor alone. In addition to the labor sector, there was the *Partido Justicialista* led by Carlos

Lascano and Alberto Iturbe, the Peronist women's sector led by Delia Parodi, the *Partido Unión Popular* led by Rodolfo Tercera del Franco and Carlos Bramuglia, and a group of provincial Peronist parties loosely coordinated under the leadership of Elia Sapag.

These sectors of the Peronist movement had never been united under strong centralized leadership. Vandor, Framini, Lascano, Iturbe and Parodi, dubbed the "*Cinco Grandes*" (the five important ones), met frequently on an informal basis, but they did not speak for all of Peronism. The *Unión Popular* and the provincial Peronist parties followed their own independent lines and were not anxious to submit to the dictates of any other individual or group.

The resistance of Perón, who wanted to maintain the divided and informal nature of Peronism, also complicated the efforts to unite the movement. His defenders claimed that he feared a military coup and believed that a united institutionalized movement could more easily be suppressed than the existing multifaceted one. In fact, Perón was probably most concerned about maintaining his own influence and believed he could more easily control a divided movement.

Despite these complications, just after the March, 1965, elections, the local Peronist leadership made its first effort to reorganize the movement by establishing an informal advisory group, the *Mesa Analítica* (analytical forum), composed of representatives from all sectors. In mid-July, after several months of negotiation and discussion, the members of the *Mesa Analítica* agreed to establish a new national Peronist party by fusing the existing ones. Only the representatives of the *Unión Popular*, who wanted their party to become the basis of the new national party, opposed this decision.

Perón sought to exploit this minor division within Peronist ranks and attempted to persuade the *Unión Popular* and the provincial Peronist parties to oppose those who wanted to reorganize the movement. He succeeded with the leaders of the *Unión Popular*, but not with those of the provincial Peronist par-

es. The latter believed that despite past differences it was time to consolidate and unify the entire Peronist movement and to establish its autonomy from Perón. They therefore sought closer relations with the "62" Peronist labor unions and with the justicialist party.

Perón also sent word to the *Cinco Grandes* to expand their group to 15; he indicated who should be asked to join. The purpose of this order was to diminish the power of those who favored unification, but it produced the opposite result. The "62" Peronist unions, the provincial Peronist parties, the large majority of the 52 national Peronist deputies, and the *Cinco Grandes* resisted Perón's orders and early in September sent a delegation to Madrid to force him to reconsider.

Because Perón refused to change his instructions, the local Peronist leaders gave the appearance of carrying out his orders while continuing to work toward the establishment of a single national party. They replaced the *Cinco Grandes* and the *Mesa Analítica* with the *Junta Coordinadora Nacional del Peronismo*, and they postponed the actual formation of the new political party as Perón had asked. But, at the same time, they began to create the basis for such a party by uniting the Peronist forces in each province and centralizing leadership in the *Junta Coordinadora Nacional*. This new junta, composed of 26 members instead of the 15 proposed by Perón, represents all sectors of the movement and is strongly in favor of unifying Peronism. The Illia government's approach to the Peronists has been the most successful of all approaches in the past ten years. The Peronists are now seeking to work for their goals within the institutional structure of the country and have decided to avoid any action, such as their occupation of factories in May and June of 1964, which could be interpreted as subversive. The Peronists do not want to give the government any reason to reimpose the proscription of their party nor do they want to give any faction of the military an excuse to overthrow the government.

There is of course no certainty that the new relationship between the government and the

Peronists will continue because at any time the armed forces may well intervene. It has, however, given the government time to begin to solve the other critical problems that beset the country.

## ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Argentina's economic problems are serious, and its economic policy has been attacked from every side. Nevertheless, for the first time in many years, a significant increase in the growth rate and other developments suggest that at least a partial recovery from economic stagnation is under way. In 1964, the gross national product was 7 per cent above the 1963 level and this same high growth rate continued during the first eight months of 1965. Other encouraging signs have been the foreign trade surplus resulting from an increased European demand for grain and wool, a substantial growth in tax receipts, and an increase in overall employment.

In order to assure continued economic growth at the present level the government drew up a development plan calling for a \$16.1 billion gross fixed investment over the next five years. But the large annual fiscal deficit, the balance of payments problem, and the substantial foreign debt raise serious doubts as to whether the government will be able to finance its plan. At present, the fiscal debt is running at a rate of more than three-quarters of a billion dollars annually, the largest single item being the \$334 million annual deficit of the state-owned and state-operated railroads.

To alleviate this situation the transport ministry announced at the end of July, 1965, a four-year railroad development plan intended to reduce the operating deficit by 42 per cent. The plan calls for a reduction in the number of railroad-operated repair shops from 26 to 19 and, through natural attrition, for the reduction in the present work force from 200,000 to 160,000. In addition, antiquated work rules will be modernized to increase productivity, new engines and cars will be purchased, and nearly 5,000 miles of track will be renewed or reconditioned.

If the plan is carried out it is estimated that

it will reduce the annual operating deficit of the railroads from \$334 million to \$193 million by the end of 1969, but there are a number of indications that the plan may not work out. The railroad unions expressed their opposition to the plan; consequently, Illia postponed its introduction. In addition, the cost of implementing the plan is estimated at more than a billion dollars over the four-year period and there is no mention how the government will obtain these funds. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to be optimistic with regard to the success of the railroad reform.

The balance of payments problem has been aggravated by Illia's cancellation of government contracts with more than a dozen foreign-owned oil companies. Despite the fact that these contracts had led to a substantial increase in oil production, Illia, in his election campaign in mid-1963, claimed that they had been negotiated illegally and had to be annulled. One of his first acts as president was to cancel these contracts. As a result, oil production began to decline and the country was forced to import large quantities of oil. In 1965 alone, Argentina will spend some \$100 million of her scarce foreign reserves to import oil, and in 1966 she will have to spend nearly as much for the same purpose.

Another serious problem affecting the financing of the development plan is the country's extensive foreign debt. In 1965, \$866.5 million of foreign debts, both governmental and private, were due and in 1966 another \$564.6 million of debts will be due. So far the government has succeeded in refinancing only \$224 million of the 1965 debt and \$80 million of the 1966 debt. The reluctance of foreign investors to refinance these debts casts serious doubts on the government's ability to borrow the necessary money to make its development plan a success.

In light of the large fiscal deficit and the foreign debt, the government has resorted to inflationary borrowing to balance its annual budgets. Unable to raise sufficient revenue or to cut expenses very much, the government increased the treasury's borrowing power by broadening the Central Bank's ability to ab-

sorb government securities. This led to rapid inflation and, as a consequence, the peso was devaluated by 18 per cent in 1965 alone. The cost of living is rising at a rate of about 30 per cent a year and price control and other remedial measures have not corrected the situation.

Thus, despite a substantial increase in the growth rate of the economy, the Illia government's economic policies face severe criticism from the military. Some elements within the armed forces have attacked the government's "excessive interference" in the economy and almost all sectors of the military have urged the government to hold down inflation. Only a few months ago Illia's own defense minister, Leopoldo Suarez, warned the economic minister, Juan Carlos Pugliese, to limit government spending to avoid trouble with the military. So far, the Illia government has managed to placate the armed forces and to keep the economic situation under control. But the military may intervene any time a new crisis arises.


## FOREIGN POLICY

In the field of foreign policy, the government continues to support the free world on political issues while seeking to develop economic relations with all the countries of the world. But the major foreign policy issue in Argentina, as well as in many other Latin American countries this year, has been how to respond to the situation in the Dominican Republic. From the beginning, the Argentine armed forces wanted to send troops to participate in the hemispheric peace-keeping force operating in the Dominican Republic. The chamber of deputies, however, opposed any such move and successfully blocked it. On May 14, 1965, it adopted a resolution

*(Continued on page 368)*

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Samuel L. Bailly spent 1959 working in rural Mexican community and 1963 in Argentina doing research on a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. He is currently preparing a book on nationalism and organized labor in Argentina.



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# President Johnson on the Alliance for Progress

*On August 17, 1965, Lyndon B. Johnson marked the fourth anniversary of the Alliance for Progress at a special ceremony at the White House. Excerpts from his address on that occasion follow:*

Four years ago this hemisphere embarked upon a great adventure—the greatest perhaps since an unknown Italian mariner touched these shores almost five centuries ago.

It was nothing less than to transform the life of an entire continent. . . .

The adventure began in a dozen scattered spots. In Colombia, the Act of Bogotá, was signed. In Caracas, Romulo Betancourt moved a nation from dictatorship to a living and hopeful democracy. In Costa Rica, and Mexico, and in many other places, new standards were being shaped; old dreams were taking on fresh meaning. Across the hemisphere revolution was in the air, promising these three things: freedom, and justice, and progress. . . .

And 5 months later—4 years ago today—on the coast of Uruguay, 20 American Republics solemnly resolved to establish and to carry forward an Alliance for Progress.<sup>1</sup>

That act was a turning point, not only in the history of the New World but in the long history of freedom itself. . . .

This 4 years has been the greatest period of forward movement, progress, and fruitful change that we have ever made in the history of this hemisphere. And that pace is now increasing.

Last year Latin America as a whole exceeded the Alliance for Progress target of 2½ per cent per capita growth rate. Our ex-

perts tell me that we will do the same this year. And in the Central American Common Market the growth is almost 7 per cent.

A large and swelling flood of resource contributes to this progress. In 4 years the United States alone has contributed almost \$4½ billion in grants, in loans, in goods and in expert assistance. The nations of Latin America have channeled \$22-24 billion into development. And more than an extra billion dollars have come from other countries and international agencies.

At the heart of the Alliance are the two urgencies of planning and reform. Ten nations have already submitted development programs, and others are on the way. Fourteen nations now have major tax reforms underway, and their rate of tax collection steadily increasing. Fourteen nations have now instituted land reform programs. Others are confronting the growing importance of population control. One government after another is determined to reconcile reform and economic growth with the struggle against destructive inflation. . . .

In my own country we have constantly worked to improve the speed and the usefulness of our own participation in the Alliance and we have made remarkable progress. . . .

But it is not just enough to continue doing what we are doing. From the experience of the achievement and the failures of the first 4 years, we can now shape new directions.

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<sup>1</sup> For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see *Current History*, January, 1964, page 39.



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## BOOK REVIEWS

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# Readings on Latin America

BY MARTIN H. SABLE

*Research Associate, University of California at Los Angeles*

Alexander, Robert J. *Labor Relations in Argentina, Brazil and Chile*. New York: McGraw Hill, 1962. 411 pp.

Twentieth century industrial relations within the framework of public policy and company decision-making is considered in depth by a specialist in the field.

*The Venezuelan Democratic Revolution; a Profile of the Regime of Rómulo Betancourt*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1964. 345 pp.

Aspects of President Betancourt's administration considered in detail include land reform, industrial development, policy on petroleum, education and public services.

Blanksten, George I. (Martha J. Porter, ed.). *The United States' Role in Latin America*. River Forest: Laidlaw Brothers, 1962. 67 pp.

The topics covered include Latin American government and politics, economy, history and society, "the colossus of the North," regional cooperation and organization, Latin American economic problems and current political problems.

Business International, Inc. *Latin America's Merging Market; the Challenge of Economic Integration*. New York: 1964. 55 pp.

The achievements of LAFTA (Latin American Free Trade Association) and of the Central American Common Market as of 1964 are surveyed.

Committee for Economic Development. *Economic Development of Central America; Desarrollo Económico de Centroamérica*. New York: 1964. 123 pp.

Central American economic development depends on progress in education, agriculture, finance and trade. This work summarizes Central American economic integration; it also contains land-reform laws and statistical tables.

Cruz Costa, João. *A History of Ideas in Brazil; the Development of Philosophy in Brazil and the Evolution of National History*. (Translation from the Portuguese by Suzette Macedo.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964. 427 pp.

This unique contribution to Brazilian intellectual history explores the main currents of European philosophy as adapted in the Brazilian frame of reference.

Dyer, John M. *United States-Latin American Trade and Financial Relations*. Coral Gables: University of Miami Press, 1961. 188 pp.

Professor Dyer studies the *modus vivendi* of United States-Latin American trade relations and the effects of capital flow on the trade in 1960. Part 3 is a statistical review of trade of the Latin American nations.

Estep, Raymond. *The Latin American Nations Today*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Aerospace Studies Institute: Air University Press, 1964. 300 pp.

This comprehensive survey of the political history of each Latin American nation since World War II stresses political developments since 1950.

Furtado, Celso. *The Economic Growth of Brazil, a Survey from Colonial to Modern Times*. (Translation by Ricardo W. deAguiar and Eric C. Drysdale.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963. 285 pp.

The author, a noted Brazilian economics professor, presents a historical survey of the economic development of Brazil.

Gerassi, John. *The Great Fear; the Reconquest of Latin America by Latin Americans*. New York: Macmillan, 1963. 457 pp.

Claiming that United States-Latin American policy has supported the status quo of reaction-

ary, land-holding oligarchies, the author suggests a complete about-face in United States diplomatic, military and foreign aid policies to win friends for the United States.

Guerin, Daniel. *The West Indies and their Future*. London: Dobson, 1961. 191 pp.

A general appraisal of the socio-economic and political conditions of the islands and republics of the West Indies is given from the British viewpoint.

Harris, Marvin. *Patterns of Race in the Americas*. New York: Walker, 1964. 154 pp.

In his outspoken, well-documented study of the evolution of Latin American race relations, the author suggests a reversal of the peasants' role to avoid mass uprisings.

Horowitz, Irving L. *Revolution in Brazil*. New York: Dutton, 1964. 430 pp.

Subtitled *Politics and Society in a Developing Nation*, this scholarly work provides insight into the socio-economic, political and cultural problems of a dynamic and rapidly developing nation. Special attention is devoted to the works of Brazilian political leaders and to Brazil in the East-West conflict.

Hulet, Claude L. (comp.). *Latin American Prose in English Translation; a Bibliography*. Washington: Pan American Union, 1964. 191 pp.

In addition to literature, Dr. Hulet has listed English translations in the fields of anthropology, archaeology, biography, history, philosophy and sociology.

Inter-American Committee for Agricultural Development. *Inventory of Information Basic to the Planning of Agricultural Development in Latin America; Regional Report*. Washington: Pan American Union, 1963. 202 pp.

A primary source for those studying the most important aspects of Latin American economies, this work surveys such topics as agricultural capital and credit, land tenure, marketing, consumption and demand levels, prices and income, taxation, and governmental activity in agricultural development.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. *The World Bank Group in the Americas*. Washington: 1963. 94 pp.

A country-by-country discussion of individual economic development problems is coupled with a short description of the activities of the World

Bank group (International Finance Corporation, International Development Association and the World Bank) in solving such problems.

Jackson, William V. *Library Guide for Brazilian Studies*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Book Center, 1964. 197 pp.

Dr. Jackson locates major university research collections, in disciplines pertinent to Brazil throughout the United States. Topical headings in the table of contents include general materials, humanities, social sciences, science and technology, and cooperative development of resources.

Jaguaribe, Helio. *Burguesia y proletariado en el nacionalismo brasileño*. Buenos Aires: Eds Coyoacán, 1961. 77 pp.

The author, a noted Brazilian intellectual, uses sociological categories and dialectical Marxist method in his study of Brazilian nationalism. There is a chapter on statism and privatism.

James, Daniel. *Mexico and the Americans*. New York: Praeger, 1963. 472 pp.

In its struggle to achieve nationhood, James believes that Mexico is turning outward despite its emphasis on nationalism.

Johnson, Haynes, et al. *The Bay of Pigs*. New York: Norton, 1964. 367 pp.

The author states that his aim in writing this book is to report actual developments of the landing at the Bay of Pigs.

Johnson, John J. (ed.). *Continuity and Change in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 282 pp.

In this most significant compilation, social scientists present papers on changes affecting rural and urban workers, students, professionals, businessmen and the military.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Military and Society in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964. 308 pp.

A specialist on the Latin American military considers its influence in politics and in socio-economic fields. Its attitude toward change is stressed.

Kidder, Frederick E., and Allen D. Bushong (comps.). *Theses on Pan American Topics Prepared by Candidates for Doctoral Degrees in Universities and Colleges in the United States*

and Canada. Washington: Pan American Union, 1962. 124 pp.

This fairly complete index of doctoral dissertations spanning many disciplines covers United States and Canadian production during most of the twentieth century.

*Latin America: a Bibliography of Paperback Books.* (Compiled by David H. Andrews, and edited by T. J. Hillmon.) Washington: Reference Dept., Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress, 1964. 38 pp.

A handy check-list (as of 1964) of paperback books about Latin America in all fields.

Latourette, Kenneth S. *The Nineteenth Century outside Europe: the Americas, the Pacific, Asia and Africa.* (Christianity in a Revolutionary Age: a History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, v. 3.) New York: Harper, 1961. 527 pp.

For data on Christianity in Latin America in the nineteenth century, see pages 284 to 352. Treatment of Catholicism and Protestantism is geographic, by country and area.

Lévi-Strauss, Claude. *A World on the Wane.* (Translated from the French by John Russell.) London: Hutchinson, 1961. 404 pp.

In his study of Indian tribes in Brazil's Mato Grosso, this French anthropologist has interwoven the threads of natural and social history. There are many fine illustrations.

Lewis, Oscar. *The Children of Sánchez; Autobiography of a Mexican Family.* New York: Random House, 1961, 499 pp.

Dr. Lewis, an anthropologist, has written a literary and scientific classic, the study of a slum family in Mexico City.

Lieuwen, Edwin. *Generals against Presidents; Neomilitarism in Latin America.* New York: Praeger, 1964. 160 pp.

A specialist on the Latin American military, the author analyzes its position in each nation and suggests that it must come to terms with social reforms in order to prevent popular revolts.

Manger, William (ed.). *The Alliance for Progress: A Critical Appraisal; Papers.* Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1963. 131 pp.

Outstanding United States and Latin American specialists presented papers at the Georgetown University Colloquium in June, 1961, on

the goals, problems and prospects of the Alliance and its relationships to the O.A.S. and to inter-American cooperation.

Merrill, John C. *Gringo: the American as Seen by Mexican Journalists.* Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1963. 52 pp.

Why Mexican newspapermen maintain uncomplimentary attitudes with regard to United States citizens is the topic.

Needler, Martin C. *Latin American Politics in Perspective.* Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1963. 192 pp.

In this comparative study, the author emphasizes those aspects of politics which are common to each nation.

Parker, Franklin D. *The Central American Republics.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1964. 348 pp.

Covering a geographic area on which comparatively little has been written, this work surveys the unique qualities of each Central American nation and discusses the common heritage of this area.

Pike, Frederick B. (ed.). *The Conflict between Church and State in Latin America.* New York: Knopf, 1964. 239 pp.

The authors contend that the clergy and liberal Latin American political leaders should seek common ground for cooperation if they wish to avoid church-state conflicts.

Poblete Troncoso, Moisés, and Ben G. Burnett. *The Rise of the Latin American Labor Movement.* New York: Bookman Associates, 1960. 179 pp.

The history of Latin American labor movements and their political activities are incisively described by Ben Burnett and a Chilean, Poblete Troncoso, a longtime student of labor and agriculture.

Scobie, James R. *Argentina, a City and a Nation.* New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, 294 pp.

Let us hope that this first-rate history of the economic development of Argentina presages a trend with respect to the other Latin American nations. Stress is on the nineteenth century.

Spencer, David. *Student Politics in Latin America.* Philadelphia: U. S. National Student Association, 1965. 287 pp.

Latin American area specialists in section one provide articles on the historical background of Latin American university reform movements, university-society relations, also students in politics. Section two covers case studies of students' political roles in a rightist dictatorship, and in a politically mature nation; *fidelismo*; inter-American relations; Catholic and Marxist student groups, student congresses and student welfare.

Squirru, Rafael. *The Challenge of the New Man: a Cultural Approach to the Latin American Scene*. Washington: Pan American Union, 1964. 64 pp.

In the first of three lectures ("The Intellectual Responsibility of Specialists on Latin America") the author pleads for consideration of the subjective, together with "hard" facts.

Teichert, Pedro C. M. *Economic Policy Revolution and Industrialization in Latin America*. University: University of Mississippi Press, 1959. 282 pp.

The author of this incisive work studies the underlying causes for official Latin American policies resulting in industrialization.

United States Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. *Cuba as a Base for Subversion in America; a Study Presented to the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws*. Washington: G.P.O., 1963. 23 pp.

Communist Cuban subversion techniques are surveyed with a view toward assessing potential dangers to the Latin American countries.

United States Dept. of Defense. Army Dept. *U.S. Army Area Handbook for Venezuela, with Bibliographies*. Washington: Foreign Area Studies Division, Special Operations Office, American University, 1964. 576 pp.

Many Latin American specialists cooperated in the compilation of this comprehensive volume covering almost all aspects of Venezuelan society. Similar handbooks have been prepared for Brazil and Colombia.

United States Dept. of State. External Research Staff. *American Republics, Studies in Progress; a List of Current Social Science Research by Private Scholars and Academic Centers, (ER 6.22-1964)*. Washington: 1964. 48 pp.

This periodical bibliography, available from the State Department, is a most useful guide for

current United States research on the Latin American area.

Valle, Rafael T. *Historia de las ideas contemporáneas en Centro-América*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960. 306 pp.

The eminent *pensador* of Honduras has attempted a thorough survey of contemporary thought on Central American culture.

Wagley, Charles, (ed.). *Social Science Research on Latin America. Report and Papers of a Seminar on Latin American Studies in the United States Held at Stanford, California, July 8-August 23, 1963*. New York: Columbia University Press 1964. 338 pp.

A nucleus of top-flight Latin Americanists summarize and evaluate current knowledge of Latin America in their own fields. They describe research opportunities and include bibliographies.

Wagley, Charles, and Marvin Harris. *Minorities in the New World; Six Case Studies*. New York: Columbia University, 1958. 320 pp.

The work is based partly on research done by social scientists for UNESCO. It is an anthropological-sociological study of the plight of certain minorities in the Americas, and is concerned with the comparative, historical and functional aspects of majority-minority relations.

Whitaker, Arthur P. *Nationalism in Latin America Past and Present*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1962. 91 pp.

In a study of the qualities and developments of Latin American nationalism, the author suggests that nationalism is a ready-made buffer against Communist penetration.

Zea, Leopoldo. *The Latin American Mind*. (Translated by James H. Abbott and Lowell Dunham.) Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963. 308 pp.

The important trends in Latin American thought from Independence to the present are set forth by a noted Mexican philosopher.

Zeitlin, Maurice, and Robert Scheer. *Cuba, Tragedy in our Hemisphere*. New York: Grove Press, 1963. 316 pp.

The authors study the contributing economic and political causes underlying the fiasco in United States-Cuban relations. They hope the experience may prove useful with regard to other Latin American nations.

## BOLIVIA

(Continued from page 335)

continue to respect the social reforms of the 1952 revolution. In short, although there seems little prospect of effective political opposition, the junta cannot hope for mass support either. And each military action against the miners and laborers creates new enemies at home and abroad.

There has been little change in Bolivia's international relations, nor is there likely to be soon. There is no urgency to settle the dispute with Chile, in which Bolivia has little hope of saving even face. It is apparent that aid by international organizations will continue on a grand scale—through the International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, United Nations and others. The British Tropical Agricultural Mission continues as before. Germany still contributes in a variety of ways, including participation in the Triangular Plan (with the United States and Bolivia) for rehabilitation of the mines. Japan's colonization project serves as an example of what can be accomplished by planned settlement in the eastern lowlands. The United States sends Peace Corps volunteers to work at the community level in a variety of skills, and continues its large Agency for International Development mission, with work in health, agriculture, roadbuilding, housing and so forth. Large projects of the Alliance for Progress may provide the basis on which Bolivia can eventually be self-sustaining.

It remains to be seen whether the "Revolution of Restoration" will actually be revolutionary or restorative. The first year suggests that the social changes of Bolivia's thoroughgoing revolution of 1952 are irreversible, and that this is a rare instance in Latin America of a military coup that cannot impose a stereotypical rightist dictatorship. At the same time, Bolivia's leaders today share enough of the military mentality and concern with order to want to restore some shattered economic institutions. Their big job seems to be to provide a climate of sufficient stability

to secure the revolutionary goals of their predecessors.

## EXPERIMENT IN VENEZUELA

(Continued from page 341)

Latin America, particularly if accompanied by the acquiescence (if not support) of the United States, might seriously impair the Venezuelan regime.

A third factor will undoubtedly be the government's continued ability to deal adequately with the guerrilla menace. This in turn depends to a considerable degree on the aid which the guerrillas receive from abroad, particularly from Cuba.

A final factor that might seriously weaken the regime would be a bitter battle over the successor to President Raul Leoni. If this question should seriously split *Accion Democratica*, as happened before the 1963 campaign, or if the actual presidential contest between *Accion Democratica* and opposing parties should degenerate to extreme bitterness, resulting in arbitrary acts on both sides, the regime might also be put in danger.

Since by the time these words are printed the Leoni regime will have completed only a little more than one-third of its allotted term, it is still too early to say whether the administration will continue to be as successful as it has been in its first year and a half. However, one can undoubtedly agree with President Leoni's comment that if he completes his term successfully, and hands over the government to an elected successor, Venezuela will finally have been put on a firm democratic footing.

## THE CHILEAN DILEMMA

(Continued from page 348)

the profession were persuaded to return. When the fall term began in 1965, there was probably space for all those who wished to attend primary schools. An ambitious school lunch program was planned, in part to provide food for those who needed it and also to



persuade some to attend who otherwise might have stayed away.

The "experts" guessed inaccurately again on the eve of the election of the new legislature in March, 1965. Chile has 147 members in the chamber of deputies and 45 senators. The members of the lower house serve for four years, and all must be reelected or replaced at the end of that period. Members of the senate are elected for eight years, with about one-half of that body either reelected or replaced every four years. The "experts" concluded that Frei would be fortunate if enough of his supporters were elected to sustain a presidential veto. (As is the case in the United States, a two-thirds vote is required to nullify a veto.)

When the returns were counted, it was found that the "right" had lost heavily—these were the Radicals, the Liberals, and the Conservatives; the "left"—Socialists and Communists—had registered slight gains, and Frei's Christian Democrats had virtually swept the field. More specifically, the Conservative party did not elect a single senator and lost 14 seats in the lower house. The Liberals lost 22 seats, and the Radicals 19. The combined strength of the Liberals, Radicals, and Conservatives in the lower house prior to the election was 84; that majority was reduced to an anemic 28. The Communists gained 2 seats in the lower house and the Socialists 3; together they have 33 seats. The Christian Democrats polled 42 per cent of the popular vote and achieved what no other single party had achieved in more than 100 years—an absolute majority in the chamber of deputies with 82 of 147 seats.

Prior to the election, the Radicals, Liberals, and Conservatives had respectively 13, 10, and 4 places in the senate. After the election they had, in the same order, 10, 5, and 2, or a net loss of 10. The Communists moved from four to six, the Socialists held the seven places they already had while the Christian Democrats moved from 4 to 13. Hence, Frei does not have a majority in the senate.

As this is written in October, 1965, the congress has agreed in principle to the proposed participation of the government in the copper

industry. Agreement on the details has not been reached although it appears that an agreement will be reached in the near future.

As President Frei has said, participation in the copper industry is fundamental to all that he wants to do. There is no indication that Frei intends to depart from his slogan of "revolution in liberty" or from one of his declarations when he said "... Chile belongs to the Americas, where our ideals have been nourished by the Judeo-Christian ethics of the western world. It is within this sphere that we must try to resolve our problems." Surely Chile cannot ignore the many problems which confront the nation. To do so would be disastrous. President Frei has set a course which is designed to produce a better life for more people.

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## ARGENTINA

*(Continued from page 360)*

drafted jointly by the Peronists and the government party, which proclaimed that "any decision to send troops abroad must be previously authorized by the Argentine congress." The resolution also condemned United States intervention in the Dominican Republic, reaffirmed Argentina's commitment to self-determination and non-intervention, and demanded the immediate withdrawal of United States troops.

This resolution led to a serious government crisis. On the one hand, the Peronists and a large portion of the government party demanded that Argentina remain neutral. On the other hand, a number of individuals within the administration, supported by many in the armed forces, insisted that the country join with the other nations of the hemisphere to police the Dominican Republic. Juan Ramón Vázquez, the under secretary of foreign affairs, resigned to protest the government's neutral policy, and there were rumors that Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Zavala Ortiz also planned to resign. Zavala Ortiz did not submit his resignation, but tension ran high until a Brazilian was appointed commander of the O.A.S. troops in the Domini-

can Republic. Because of the traditional rivalry between Argentina and Brazil, this ended the Argentine military's enthusiasm for the project.

In the next few years, the government of Argentina will most likely continue much as it has during the past two years primarily because its current policy is its only hope of survival. It will emphasize reconciliation of all sectors of society, and will attempt to continue the high level of economic growth while holding down the fiscal deficit, hoping that the increase in political stability and the economic growth will discourage any interference on the part of the military.

The Peronists, too, can be expected to continue along the policy lines developed in 1965. They will continue their efforts to institutionalize the movement and probably will create a new united Peronist party. In addition, they will make sure that none of their actions can be construed as in any way subversive, to avoid a military coup or proscription of their activities.

The armed forces seem to hold the key to the future in Argentina, because they can easily step in and overthrow the government. Their opposition to the government seems to be increasing and it is probable that they will interfere in some way in the elections of March, 1967. Unlike the recent elections, those scheduled for 1967 will determine who will control the provinces and the national congress, and the Peronists, if permitted, will win a number of important positions as they did in the annulled elections of 1962. The military has repeatedly fought against such a possibility and would not hesitate to do so again.

There are, however, several alternatives open to the armed forces. They could stage a coup to oust Illia and establish some form of military rule before the next elections. This type of action has not proved very successful in the past and therefore will probably be used only as a last resort. More likely, the military will attempt to make an agreement with the Peronists whereby the latter would not put up candidates for the governorships of the key provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba

and Entre Rios, in return for being permitted a free hand in the other provinces.

This latter alternative seems most probable. The military has a dislike for direct rule of the country, preferring instead to be the power behind the government. And as the Peronists work themselves into the institutional structure of the country, it becomes increasingly difficult for the armed forces to attack them as subversives who should be kept out of power. If this development is allowed to continue it may provide the political stability necessary for the government to deal effectively with its other problems.

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## INTERIM REGIME IN BRAZIL

*(Continued from page 355)*

a moderately modernizing, and (in particular limited spheres) a renovating or even reforming government.

However effective this mixture of technicians, old-line "liberal" politicians, and patriotic military may be for the immediate situation, it appears insufficient for the long-run modernization of Brazil, given the complexity and magnitude of the country's problems.

In contrast with the 1961-1964 period, fewer advocates of change expect to find either the providential man or a quick and easy "revolutionary" solution. And there are some signs, albeit far too few for comfort, that elements of the entrenched Brazilian élite are beginning to accept the need for at least some form of defensive modernization.

How this idea will fare remains to be seen. For this development to flourish, the Brazilian military must learn to distinguish between Communist and indigenous radical reformist views.

The Castelo Branco administration lacks understanding of the processes of social and political change and the immediacy of the needs of emerging groups, both urban and rural. This it may still gain, for one of the most encouraging developments in Brazil today is a widespread desire to define Brazilian reality more adequately and to find truly Brazilian solutions for its problems.

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# THE MONTH IN REVIEW

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*A CURRENT HISTORY Chronology covering the most important events of October, 1965, to provide a day-by-day summary of world affairs.*

## INTERNATIONAL

### Berlin

- Oct. 8—A U.S. army spokesman discloses that Soviet soldiers prevented U.S. train commanders yesterday from inspecting 4 U.S. trains traveling inside East Germany between Berlin and West Germany.
- Oct. 14—The Western Allies order civil defense measures to be taken in West Berlin.

### Disarmament

- Oct. 27—U.S. disarmament negotiator William C. Foster tells the U.N. political committee that the U.S. proposal to reduce nuclear weapons' stockpiles would involve the destruction of thousands of weapons by the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

### European Economic Community (Common Market)

- Oct. 14—In a television address, Premier Georges Pompidou asserts that France will consider all proposals made by the other E.E.C. governments for a settlement of the Common Market agricultural crisis.
- Oct. 26—At a Council of Ministers meeting of the 5 active members of the E.E.C., a declaration is adopted urging France to resume participation in the Common Market. The Council also invites France to a special Council session.

### European Free Trade Association

- Oct. 29—The chairman of the E.F.T.A. Council of Ministers, Per Haekkerup, issues a statement to the Common Market countries proposing talks on improving relations between the 2 trade groups.

### North Atlantic Treaty Organization

- Oct. 5—Addressing the 11th annual meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization parliamentarians' conference, U.S. Vice-

President Hubert Humphrey declares that the NATO countries must make a joint effort to help the "emerging countries . . . maintain and indeed strengthen their independence. . . ."

- Oct. 16—A French proposal to reorganize NATO is published in *Politique Etrangère* (a quarterly review of foreign affairs). It is reported that the plan has the support of French President Charles de Gaulle. As proposed, the plan calls for a "simplified treaty of alliance" among the NATO powers and for a second European pact (to exclude the U.S.) to integrate Western European nonnuclear facilities.

### Organization of African Unity

- Oct. 21—The O.A.U. conference in Accra, Ghana, is opened by Ghanaian President Kwame Nkrumah.
- Oct. 22—The O.A.U. adopts a resolution urging Britain to seize control of Rhodesia by force if necessary to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence.
- Oct. 26—The third annual heads-of-state meeting closes.

### United Nations

- Oct. 12—Secretary-General U Thant, in a report to the General Assembly's Administrative and Budgetary Committee, asks that members make voluntary contributions to help the U.N. meet its expenses through 1965.

The U.S. Representative to the U.N. Arthur J. Goldberg, tells the General Assembly that the U.S. will not recognize Rhodesia if it unilaterally declares its independence. The General Assembly approves a resolution urging Britain "to take all steps necessary" to prevent Rhodesia from illegally declaring its independence. (See also *Rhodesia*.)

Oct. 14—U Thant reports that India and Pakistan have failed to “withdraw all armed personnel” from battle areas in Kashmir and along the Indian-Pakistani border, as demanded by the Security Council last month. (See also *India and Pakistan*.)

Oct. 15—Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa addresses the General Assembly and attacks the U.S.

Oct. 22—U Thant announces that he has named Major General Syseno Sarmento of Brazil to serve as his representative to carry out the cease-fire agreement and the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan troops.

Oct. 25—Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto tells the Security Council that India has initiated a “reign of terror” in Kashmir.

The Soviet delegate, Nikolai T. Fedorenko, accuses U Thant of exceeding his mandate in negotiating a Kashmir settlement. He urges the Security Council to set a 3-month limit on the U.N. observer teams on the Pakistani-Indian border.

## AFGHANISTAN

Oct. 14—King Mohammed Zahir Shah opens the first democratically elected parliament.

Oct. 30—Premier Mohammad Yousuf resigns because of ill health.

## ARGENTINA

Oct. 21—Argentine workers, attempting to hold protest rallies and marches to demonstrate against a government decree prohibiting labor unions from engaging in politics, clash with police.

## AUSTRIA

Oct. 22—The coalition cabinet of Chancellor Joseph Klaus resigns when no agreement is reached on the budget for next year.

## BRAZIL

Oct. 3—Anti-government candidates win in 5 out of 11 gubernatorial elections held today.

Oct. 4—Ex-President Juscelino Kubitschek returns after 16 months in exile.

Oct. 27—President Humberto Castelo Branco issues an Institutional Act (including basic constitutional amendments) that dis-

solves all political parties. Declaring himself ineligible for another term, he decrees that congress, rather than popular ballot, will elect his successor by October 3, 1966. In addition to giving Castelo Branco greater powers, the decree increases the number of supreme court judges from 11 to 16. His action comes shortly before congress is to vote on his request for greater powers over state governors, a request attacked by all parties.

Oct. 28—Minister of Justice Juracy Magalhaes announces that the government will proceed at once to establish a “Party of the Revolution” to carry on Castelo Branco’s program.

## BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

(See the individual countries listed in alphabetical order.)

### BURUNDI

Oct. 19—It is reported that an anti-government coup in Burundi has been foiled. King Mwami Mwambutsa IV is safe but Premier Leopold Biha has been shot and is critically wounded.

Oct. 22—It is reported that last night 34 policemen and soldiers, implicated in the attempted revolt, were shot by a firing squad.

Oct. 23—Bahutu mobs attack Watutsi tribesmen near the village of Muramuva.

### CAMBODIA

Oct. 17—Prince Norodom Sihanouk, chief of state, returns from a trip to Communist China and North Korea, cancelling plans to visit East Europe. He asserts that his friendship with the Soviet Union has ended because Soviet leaders cancelled his visit to the U.S.S.R.

Oct. 19—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) reports a Soviet government statement affirming continuing friendship for Cambodia.

### CHINA, PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF

Oct. 1—France and China sign a cultural exchange agreement.

In Peking, a parade is held to mark the 16th anniversary of Communist rule.

Oct. 3—At a banquet in Peking given by

visiting Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Premier Chou En-lai of Communist China declares that his country will help the Indochinese people oust U.S. forces if the U.S. enlarges the war in Vietnam.

Oct. 5—The Peking radio reports that a U.S. fighter plane has been shot down over China's mainland. China charges that 4 U.S. planes have intruded into Chinese airspace.

Oct. 25—It is announced that Canada has agreed to sell China over 223 million bushels of wheat, estimated to cost about \$403 million.

### CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE (Leopoldville)

Oct. 7—An army communiqué discloses that government troops killed 115 rebels during a battle outside the town of Baraka.

Oct. 13—President Joseph Kasavubu dismisses Premier Moise Tshombe and names Evariste Kimba to succeed him. Kasavubu tells the new parliament that according to a constitutional requirement Tshombe's "transitional" government was supposed to resign with the opening of the new parliament.

Oct. 18—Kimba's new 19-member cabinet is installed.

### CUBA

Oct. 3—The Havana radio announces that the National Directorate of the ruling United Party of the Socialist Revolution (Communist) has chosen a new central committee of 104 and a politburo of 8 men.

Oct. 4—Premier Fidel Castro discloses that Major Ernesto Che Guevara, who had been the third-ranking leader, left Cuba earlier this year after relinquishing his Cuban citizenship and government posts.

Oct. 6—The U.S. sends a message to the Cuban government outlining plans for the orderly removal of Cuban emigrants seeking asylum in the U.S. Last month, Premier Castro promised that any Cuban wishing to leave for the U.S. might do so.

Oct. 13—Acting through the intermediary offices of the Swiss government, Cuban

authorities notify the U.S. that some of the U.S. proposals for the orderly evacuation of refugees have been accepted.

Oct. 28—The Cuban government prohibits small boats from taking Cuban refugees to the U.S. Heretofore, Cuban exiles in the U.S. have chartered boats for removing Cuban refugees to the U.S. Now, orderly arrangements are almost complete.

### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Oct. 19—In downtown Santo Domingo army troops and tanks begin Operation Cleanup, to rid the city of rebels who have refused to surrender their arms.

Oct. 23—It is reported that in shooting in Santo Domingo last night, 3 civilians were killed. Army units deny any participation in the shooting, which followed the start of a house-to-house inspection drive to round up illegally-held weapons.

Oct. 25—In Santo Domingo, inter-American forces, reinforced by U.S. tanks, occupy the former rebel sector, at the request of President Hector Garcia-Goody.

Oct. 26—Dominicans demonstrate in Santo Domingo to demand the removal of U.S. troops.

### FRANCE

(See also *Intl. E.E.C.*)

Oct. 12—The defense ministry confirms that 30 underground missile sites will be constructed.

Oct. 14—The National Assembly approves a Sahara oil and aid pact with Algeria; France will provide \$200 million in aid and increased oil royalties.

Oct. 28—French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville arrives in Moscow on a visit.

### GERMANY, FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF

Oct. 19—The coalition of Ludwig Erhard's Christian Democratic Union and Erich Mende's Free Democratic party reelects Eugen Gerstenmaier as president of the Bundestag.

Oct. 20—The Bundestag votes, 272-200 (15 abstentions) to reelect Chancellor Ludwig Erhard.

Oct. 26—Erhard's new cabinet is sworn in.



## GREAT BRITAIN

- Oct. 6—The Conservative party publishes a manifesto outlining the Conservative party's platform.
- Oct. 12—The government discloses that the trade gap narrowed by £22 million (\$61.6 million) in September.
- Oct. 14—At a Conservative party conference, the Conservatives' defense spokesman, Enoch Powell, recommends that British commitments east of Suez—in the Middle and Far East—be abandoned.
- Oct. 26—Parliament reconvenes. Horace King, a Labour M.P., is chosen as speaker; he replaces Sir Harry Hylton-Foster, a Conservative. By persuading a Liberal to accept one of the other 2 nonvoting offices in Parliament, the Labour government is able to maintain a majority of 3.
- Oct. 28—Parliament completes approval of a bill abolishing capital punishment.
- Oct. 31—Prime Minister Harold Wilson returns to London from his visit to Rhodesia. (See also *Rhodesia*.)

## British Territories

### ADEN

- Oct. 3—In anti-British rioting yesterday and today in Crater (an Arab settlement), over 760 persons are arrested. The riots protest a British decision to suspend the constitution and to subject Aden to the direct rule of the British High Commissioner.
- Oct. 5—The British High Commission warns the Petroleum Workers' Union against staging a strike tomorrow to demand the release of P.W.U. General Secretary Muhammad Saleh al-Aulaqi. (See also *Syria*.)
- Oct. 7—Oil workers continue to strike for the second day. Student demonstrators are dispersed by police using tear gas.
- Oct. 8—Oil workers return to their jobs.
- Oct. 13—Students demonstrate in Aden; the Government orders 14 schools shut down.

### RHODESIA

- Oct. 1—Prime Minister Ian Smith, in a television interview, declares that the question of independence for Rhodesia has

been unsettled too long. He will leave next week for talks in London that "must be final and conclusive."

- Oct. 8—Prime Minister Smith ends talks with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson; no agreement on Rhodesian independence has been reached and no further meetings are scheduled. The British have insisted that Rhodesian independence cannot proceed unless Rhodesia guarantees majority rule (there are 220,000 whites and 4 million Africans).
- Oct. 13—Prime Minister Smith, in a television interview following his return to Rhodesia, declares that his cabinet will "talk and talk and talk" so that its decision on unilateral independence will be "the right one."
- Oct. 18—A restriction order is served on R. S. Garfield Todd, who was premier for 4 years when the country was part of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland; he is considered a liberal. Todd is restricted to his farm at Shabani for 12 months.
- Oct. 20—Prime Minister Smith announces that the Rhodesian cabinet has made a "decision in principle" on independence, but refuses to disclose it. He sends a message to Wilson appealing "at this 11th hour" for Britain to grant independence to Rhodesia on the basis of the 1961 constitution. Smith also offers to sign a treaty guaranteeing that white Rhodesians will not violate the constitution. Theoretically, the 1961 constitution provides for majority rule when enough Africans can meet educational and property qualifications for voting.
- Oct. 25—British Prime Minister Harold Wilson arrives in Rhodesia for talks with Smith.
- Oct. 30—Wilson announces that Britain and Rhodesia have agreed to create a royal commission to study the problems raised by independence for Rhodesia under the 1961 constitution. Wilson departs for Zambia and Ghana.

### GREECE

- Oct. 5—Seven new cabinet ministers and 7 under-secretaries are sworn in, thus

completing the cabinet of Prime Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos.

## INDIA

(See also *Pakistan*)

Oct. 3—It is reported that India has sent 2 notes to China protesting Chinese violations of the Tibet-Sikkim border area.

Indian President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan meets with President Tito during a 4-day state visit to Yugoslavia.

Oct. 10—It is reported that in Srinagar (summer capital of Kashmir) crowds have rioted to protest the arrests of 5 leaders of the self-determination movement for Kashmir.

Oct. 16—It is reported that Indian sources estimate that fewer than 600 infiltrators remain in the Indian part of Kashmir.

In 2 letters sent to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, Pakistan accuses India of violating the cease-fire twice last week.

Oct. 17—The Kashmir government closes all schools and colleges in Srinagar because of student demonstrations demanding a plebiscite for Kashmir.

*The New York Times* reports that during President Radhakrishnan's trip to Rumania earlier this month, the Rumanian government offered to use its good offices to settle the Indian-Chinese border conflict.

Oct. 19—Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri declares that his government will not try to develop an atomic bomb. Last month 86 members of parliament asked India to begin to develop nuclear arms.

Oct. 21—Some 30 leaders of the self-determination movement for Kashmir are arrested.

## INDONESIA

Oct. 1—The Indonesian radio announces that an attempt to overthrow President Sukarno was thwarted by forces loyal to General Abdul Haris Nasution. Late yesterday, it is reported, the 30th of September Movement seized control of Jakarta; the rebels were led by Lieutenant Colonel Untung (who was captured today). Untung declared that he was heading off a "counter-revolutionary" coup by a "Generals' Council."

Oct. 3—In a radio broadcast President Sukarno assures Indonesians that he is "still head of state and . . . running the Government."

Oct. 4—It is reported by Western sources in Singapore that right-wing generals in Indonesia have seized control in Jakarta and that President Sukarno is seeking to regain full control.

The bodies of 6 generals, kidnapped on October 1 by rebels, are found.

Oct. 8—In Jakarta, thousands of Muslim youths, crying "Long live America," attack the headquarters of the Communist party (P.K.I.) and burn it to the ground. The Communists are being held responsible for the attempted revolt. It is reported that the army has arrested 200 Communists in Jakarta.

Oct. 10—Unofficial estimates put the number of Communists and rebels arrested today at 1,000. President Sukarno returns to his palace in Jakarta.

Oct. 12—According to an Indonesian radio broadcast, Colonel Untung has been captured in Java.

Oct. 13—It is reported that President Sukarno plans to create an all-Indonesian Communist party free from Communist Chinese influence, and that he has reached agreement with General Nasution. In Jakarta, anti-Communist demonstration continue.

Oct. 21—*Antara* (official press agency) reports that the cabinet presidium has directed all ministers to suspend any Communist-affiliated organizations within their jurisdictions. The Communist party of Indonesia has not been formally banned.

Oct. 22—President Sukarno orders an end to retaliatory action against the attempted coup and forbids "racial attacks" against Chinese living in Indonesia, in an attempt to curb anti-Communist hostility.

Oct. 23—Sukarno threatens to order arm troops to shoot to kill persons engaged in demonstrations or violence against Indonesian Communists.

Oct. 26—According to Western sources, some 3,000 persons have demonstrated before the Foreign Ministry building in Jakarta.

supported by the army, they have been yelling insults at Red China, the Indonesian Communist party and Foreign Minister Subandrio.

Oct. 31—The Indonesian army discloses that Communist rebels are in control of 2 areas in central Java.

## ISRAEL

Oct. 1—An Israeli patrol kills a member of the El Fatah guerrilla band; the Arab group has engaged in terrorism along the Israeli-Jordanian armistice line.

Oct. 31—A clash between Israelis and Jordanians at a border area is stopped by U.N. observers.

## KOREA, REPUBLIC OF (South)

Oct. 7—Opposition members who have been boycotting the National Assembly for almost 2 months decide to return. The boycott protested the Korean-Japanese Friendship Treaty.

## NIGERIA

Oct. 12—It is reported that violence marked a parliamentary election in the Western Region yesterday; 4 persons are dead and over 25 have been hospitalized.

Oct. 14—It is reported by *The New York Times* that widespread irregularities in counting votes have occurred in the Western Region.

## NORWAY

Oct. 5—The head of the Center party, Per Borten, forms a new 4-party coalition cabinet in which the Conservative party will have the largest number of ministers. Borten will serve as premier. In last month's general election, former Premier Einar Gerhardsen's Labor party failed to win a majority of seats in parliament.

## PAKISTAN

Oct. 1—The Pakistani radio announces that last night Indian troops attacked Pakistani positions in southwestern Kashmir.

Oct. 6—In a note to U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, Pakistan warns that India is planning "major offensive operations which would destroy the cease-fire agreement"

in Kashmir. (See also *Intl, U.N. and India.*)

## SINGAPORE

Oct. 15—It is announced that Singapore has been admitted to membership in the Commonwealth.

## SUDAN, THE

Oct. 28—The 7 National Unionist party ministers in the coalition cabinet under Premier Mohammed Ahmed Mahgoub resign.

## SYRIA

Oct. 6—Over 5,000 Syrian petroleum workers strike in a show of sympathy for oil strikers in Aden.

Oct. 18—It is reported that President Amin el-Hafez's regime seems to be in full control; recently strife within the ruling Baath party had been reported.

## TANZANIA

Oct. 1—President Julius K. Nyerere is sworn in for a new 5-year term.

## TURKEY

Oct. 10—A general election is held in Turkey.

Oct. 11—The Justice party wins approximately 260 seats in the 450-man Grand National Assembly.

Oct. 27—Premier Suleyman Demirel announces his new cabinet.

## U.S.S.R., THE

Oct. 1—The Soviet government submits to the Supreme Soviet a bill to establish 28 powerful central industrial ministries; they will replace the present regional management system.

Oct. 3—It is announced that at a 2-day meeting of the Supreme Soviet, Leonid Brezhnev, first secretary of the Soviet Communist party, has been chosen a member of the 30-man Presidium, giving him an official state position. Other government posts are also filled.

Oct. 4—*Tass* (Soviet press agency) reports that a new moon shot, Luna 7, has been successfully launched.

Premier Brezhnev receives Janos Kadar, leader of the Hungarian Communist party, in Moscow.

Oct. 8—*Tass* reports that Luna 7 reached the moon but failed in the attempt to make a soft landing. According to *Tass*, "most operations necessary for a soft landing were fulfilled during the approach to the moon."

Oct. 16—U.S. Defense Department officials reveal that the U.S. detected a Soviet underground nuclear test last week.

Oct. 31—Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin confers with visiting French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville.

Brezhnev confers secretly with the first secretary of the Polish United Workers (Communist) party, Wladyslaw Gomulka.

### UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Oct. 3—It is reported that 2 days ago, the new premier of the U.A.R., Zakariya Mo-hieddin, named a 30-man cabinet. In 2 decrees, President Gamal Abdel Nasser accepts the new cabinet and the resignation of Premier Aly Sabry.

### UNITED STATES, THE Civil Rights

(See also *U.S. Government*, Oct. 19)

Oct. 5—In Natchez, Mississippi, over 100 Negro demonstrators, including civil rights leader Charles Evers, are arrested.

Oct. 8—Negro leaders deny an appeal by Georgia Governor Carl E. Sanders for a moratorium on racial protests in Crawfordville, Georgia.

In Crawfordville, Negro students attempt to integrate all-white school buses; state troopers prevent the Negroes from boarding the buses.

Oct. 11—Dr. Martin Luther King arrives in Crawfordville to discuss the drive to integrate all-white schools. Civil rights demonstrators have been protesting the transfer of all 165 white students to schools in surrounding counties.

Oct. 14—A 3-judge federal court in Augusta, Georgia, rules that unless school desegregation is worked out in Crawfordville, all state and local funds used for white pupils in Taliaferro County will be frozen. The 3-judge panel declares the county system bankrupt and orders it put under the management of the state superintendent of schools.

In Jackson, Mississippi, a federal judge orders school officials to admit students, whose parents do not live in the state, to Mississippi schools without tuition. A new state law requires such students, who are mostly Negro, to pay tuition.

Oct. 17—*The New York Times* reports that "civil rights and race relations organizations" are protesting the U.S. Office of Education's policy of defining Southern school compliance with the Civil Rights Act. Some Southern schools "integrate" by permitting Negroes to attend the school of their choice; this policy makes the Negro responsible for desegregation.

Oct. 22—In a second trial, an all-white Alabama jury finds Collie Leroy Wilkins, Jr., not guilty of the murder of civil rights worker Viola Gregg Liuzzo.

Oct. 23—Martin Luther King, in Paris, declares that he will return from Europe to organize a protest movement against the acquittal of Collie Leroy Wilkins.

Oct. 28—In Lincolnton, Georgia, some 50 Negro men block a civil rights march, claiming that they are satisfied with things as they are.

Oct. 30—The Southern Education Reporting Service publishes a report disclosing that out of 5,040 school districts in the South only 69 have made no effort to comply with the provisions of the Civil Rights Act.

### Economy

Oct. 12—It is reported that yesterday price averages on the stock market reached new peaks.

Oct. 13—The Commerce Department reports that the gross national product increased \$11 billion in the third quarter of this year.

Secretary of Commerce John T. Connor discloses the contents of a letter sent to 400 companies participating in the voluntary program to halt the flow of U.S. capital overseas; he informs the companies that they will be asked to continue the voluntary program "through 1966."

The Bureau of Labor Statistics of the Labor Department reports that nonfarm payroll employment reached a record 61,625,000 in September.

Oct. 26—The General Motors Corporation reports that, in the first 9 months of the year, it made the largest profit of any company to date, \$1.5 billion on sales of \$14.9 billion.

Oct. 31—President Lyndon B. Johnson orders a meeting of top government officials responsible for stockpiling strategic materials to discuss dumping surplus aluminum on the market. Johnson is reportedly reacting to a decision by 3 aluminum producers to raise their prices.

## Foreign Policy

Oct. 4—President Johnson and Pope Paul VI hold private talks for 46 minutes in New York City.

Oct. 13—U.S. officials reveal that the U.S. has reissued invitations to visit to President Mohammad Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri of India.

U.S. Senator Robert Kennedy (D.-N.Y.), in a Senate speech, declares that the U.S. ought to invite Communist China to attend the 17-nation Geneva disarmament talks.

Oct. 15—In cities throughout the U.S., rallies are held to protest U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Oct. 16—In New York City, over 10,000 persons parade down Fifth Avenue to demonstrate against the U. S. commitment in Vietnam. Sympathetic rallies are staged overseas in London, Brussels, Dublin, Stockholm and Tokyo. (See also *U.S. Government*.)

Oct. 20—The State Department confirms that the U.S. will withdraw from the Warsaw Convention of 1929 unless a much higher limit is set on the amount of liability an airline must pay in case of death or injury to its passengers.

## Government

Oct. 3—President Johnson signs a liberalized immigration bill (See *Current History, Month in Review, U.S., Gov't.*, Sept. 30) at Liberty Island, in New York harbor.

Oct. 5—The Senate completes congressional action on a \$3.218 billion foreign aid ap-

propriation bill for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966.

Oct. 8—At the Bethesda Naval Hospital, President Johnson is operated on for removal of his gall bladder and a ureteral stone. White House Press Secretary Bill Moyers states that the operation was a "complete success."

Oct. 12—The Senate majority leader, Mike Mansfield (D.-Mont.) obtains an overnight adjournment after being defeated 45-47 on a motion to invoke cloture against a filibuster against a bill to repeal Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act that permits state "right-to-work" laws. In effect, the bill has been killed.

The Senate completes congressional action on a 4-year farm support bill, under which the federal government will maintain market prices on cotton at a lower level, but cotton growers will receive cash subsidies from the Treasury to maintain their incomes.

Oct. 13—The Senate completes congressional action on the Highway Beautification Act; the bill will regulate billboards and junkyards along roads built with federal aid.

Oct. 15—The Senate completes congressional action on an omnibus \$4.3 billion public works appropriation bill.

Oct. 17—Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach announces that the Justice Department has begun an investigation of the various groups that oppose the draft and the war in Vietnam. (See also *U.S. Foreign Policy*.)

Oct. 18—Press Secretary Moyers tells newsmen that President Johnson is dismayed by the antidraft, anti-Vietnam war movement, and that he supports the Justice Department's investigation of Communist infiltration among the pacifist groups.

David J. Miller, 22, a Catholic peace worker who publicly burned his draft card at a rally in New York City on October 15, is arrested by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Federal law passed August 30 prohibits destruction of draft cards.

Oct. 19—The House Committee on Un-American Activities opens hearings on the Ku Klux Klan. The Imperial Wizard of



the United Klans (the largest Ku Klux Klan organization), Robert M. Shelton, Jr., refuses to answer questions.

Oct. 20—The Senate completes congressional action on a bill providing \$2.3 billion in federal aid for higher education; the bill provides for federal scholarships and for a 6,000-man national teacher corps.

President Johnson signs an antipollution bill formally called the Clean Air Act Amendments and Solid Waste Disposal Act.

Johnson signs a \$3.2 billion foreign aid bill.

The House completes congressional action on a \$2 billion water project authorization bill, covering flood control, navigation, hurricane protection and beach erosion.

Oct. 21—President Johnson leaves Bethesda Naval Hospital to return to the White House.

Senator Edward Kennedy (D.-Mass.) proposes that the nomination to a federal judgeship of Boston Municipal Court Judge Francis X. Morrissey be sent back to the judiciary committee; in effect, Morrissey's nomination, which stirred up much controversy, is killed.

An omnibus \$4.7 billion supplementary appropriation bill passes both houses, providing funds for antipoverty, urban renewal, regional development and health programs. Funds for federal rent subsidies and for the national teacher corps are deleted.

Oct. 22—The House and Senate approve a 3.6 per cent pay increase for 1.7 million federal employees.

Johnson signs a bill eliminating duties on automobiles and auto parts imported from Canada; Canada and the U.S. will enjoy free trade on these items.

Oct. 23—President Johnson, in a message to Congress, criticizes the legislature for failing to provide funds for federal rent subsidies to low-income families.

The Congress adjourns its 1965 session shortly before 1:00 A.M.

President Johnson arrives at his Texas ranch to continue his convalescence.

Oct. 26—President Johnson signs a \$2 billion river and harbor authorization bill.

Oct. 29—Attorney General Katzenbach assigns federal voting registrars in 12 more counties in the South.

## Labor

Oct. 8—*The New York Times* and the Newspaper Guild agree to accept the recommendations of Theodore W. Kheel, N.Y. Mayor Robert Wagner's chief labor adviser, for ending the 23-day-old strike.

Oct. 10—The Newspaper Guild members employed by *The New York Times* vote to accept the agreement reached October 8. The disputants have compromised on the major issues of the strike—automation, jurisdiction, the guild shop and pensions and retirement severance pay. A \$12 a week package increase over a 2-year period is won by the Guild.

## Military

(See also *Vietnam*)

Oct. 13—The Defense Department orders that training be intensified for 150,000 members of the recently designated Selective Reserve Force (Army National Guard and Army Reserve).

Oct. 14—The Defense Department announces that the military draft quota for December has been set at 45,224 men, the largest draft call since the Korean War.

Oct. 25—The Gemini 6 manned space flight is indefinitely postponed after an Agena target rocket is launched but fails to orbit.

Oct. 26—*The New York Times* reports that some state directors and local draft boards have notified the national Selective Service headquarters that they may have to draft married men without children by December, because of increased draft quotas.

Oct. 27—Rear Admirals William A. Brockett and Charles A. Curtze, the chief and deputy chief of the Navy's Bureau of Ships, request retirement. It is reported that their resignations are in effect protests against the increased centralization of the Defense Department under Defense Secretary Robert McNamara.

Oct. 28—Defense Department officials report that the standards for volunteers for

military service will be lowered so that they are more in line with the eligibility standards set for draftees.

Oct. 29—The U.S., in an underground explosion, detonates an 80-kiloton hydrogen bomb.

## Politics

Oct. 14—In Hollywood, California, former Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater asserts that the Republican party should have denounced extremism in the 1964 campaign. He urges Republicans to resign from the John Birch Society.

Oct. 29—Press Secretary Bill Moyers announces President Johnson's support for the Democratic mayoral candidate in New York City, Abraham D. Beame.

## Supreme Court

Oct. 11—The Supreme Court refuses the appeal of 3 white parents for neighborhood schools, thus leaving in effect an order of the New York Commissioner of Education requiring pairing of elementary schools in Malverne, Long Island, to achieve better racial balance.

Oct. 21—The Justice Department files a brief with the Supreme Court asking it to accept "original jurisdiction" in deciding whether the Voting Rights Act of 1965 is constitutional; the Court is also asked to rule on Alabama, Mississippi and Louisiana state court orders enjoining local registrars from placing on voting lists the names of persons who have been registered by federal examiners.

## URUGUAY

Oct. 13—Some 100,000 civil servants stage a 72-hour general strike to demand wage increases.

Oct. 14—Steps are taken to enforce press and radio censorship, which had been invoked to curb the threat of labor violence.

## VATICAN, THE

Oct. 4—Pope Paul VI, addressing the U.N. General Assembly, appeals to the world organization that there be "no more war, never again war." His visit is the first ever made by a Pope to the Western hemisphere.

Oct. 15—The prelates of the Roman Catholic Church, meeting in Ecumenical Council Vatican II, vote to adopt a decree defining the Church's attitude toward non-Christians. The decree asserts that the Jewish people do not share a collective guilt for the crucifixion of Christ, condemns anti-Semitism, and directs Catholics to "... preserve and promote those spiritual and moral goods as well as those sociocultural values" found in all the great world religions.

Oct. 28—Before the Ecumenical Council, Pope Paul VI promulgates 4 decrees—on the role of bishops, on Christian education, on the renewal or adaptation of the religious life among the religious institutes or communities, on priestly training—and a declaration defining the relation of the Roman Catholic Church to non-Christian religions. (See Oct. 15 above.)

## VIETNAM (SOUTH)

Oct. 1—In a combined speech and news conference, Premier Nguyen Cao Ky announces a program of social reform, including land distribution to peasants. He appoints Brigadier General Nguyen Huu Co as deputy premier; Co is also minister of war and reconstruction.

Oct. 5—It is reported that General William C. Westmoreland, U.S. military commander in Vietnam, has been given permission to use tear gas when necessary to spare lives.

Oct. 7—More U.S. troops, of the U.S. 1st Division, arrive in Vietnam; they will increase the total number of U.S. soldiers to over 140,000.

Oct. 12—The Vietcong rebels call for a 1-hour nationwide strike on October 15 to display anti-U.S. sentiment.

Oct. 13—The South Vietnamese observer at the U.N., Nguyen Duy Lien, outlines his government's conditions for a settlement of the Vietnam war; among the demands is the withdrawal of all hostile (Communist) troops from South Vietnam.

Oct. 15—The Vietcong appeal for a strike goes unheeded.

Oct. 30—A South Vietnamese village is bombed by mistake, killing 48 civilians.

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